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INTRODUCTION 
ince the early 1990s, the issue of fiscal transparency has attracted 
increasing attention from international institutions, governments, 
and nongovernment actors concerned with budgets and fiscal policy 
reform. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”) has described the budget as “[t]he single most important poli-
cy document of governments, where policy objectives are reconciled and 
implemented in concrete terms.”1 In the last decade, the OECD and In-
ternational Monetary Fund (“IMF”) have embarked on significant pro-
grams to develop standards and codes of conduct on budget transparency 
and to assess country practices in this area.2 Nongovernmental organiza-
tions (“NGOs”) have developed their own indices to measure and com-
pare fiscal transparency internationally.3 At the domestic level, where 
budgeting takes place, some governments have enacted legislation to 
formalize their commitments to fiscal disclosure. 
This Article seeks to address two major questions that have received 
very limited attention from researchers: (1) What is fiscal transparency 
                                                                                                                       
 1. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., OECD Best Practices for Budget Transpa-
rency, 1(3) OECD J. ON BUDGETING 2001, at 7 [hereinafter OECD Best Practices]. 
 2. See id.; INT’L MONETARY FUND, CODE OF GOOD PRACTICES ON FISCAL TRANSPAR-
ENCY (2007), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/051507c.pdf [he-
reinafter 2007 IMF CODE]. See generally INT’L MONETARY FUND, MANUAL ON FISCAL TRANS-
PARENCY (2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/manual/manual.pdf 
[hereinafter 2001 IMF MANUAL]; INT’L MONETARY FUND, MANUAL ON FISCAL TRANS-
PARENCY (2007), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/101907m.pdf 
[hereinafter 2007 IMF MANUAL]. 
 3. In the late 1990s the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (“IDASA”) collabo-
rated with the International Budget Project (“IBP”), based in Washington, D.C., to devel-
op a survey questionnaire for evaluating budget transparency that was then applied to 
South Africa. See ALTA FÖLSCHER ET AL., TRANSPARENCY AND PARTICIPATION IN THE 
BUDGET PROCESS—SOUTH AFRICA: A COUNTRY REPORT (Dec. 2000). This methodology 
has been adapted for studies of several other countries. See Int’l Budget P’ship, Index of 
Budget Transparency in Five Latin American Countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mex-
ico and Peru, Jan. 10, 2002, http://internationalbudget.org/resources/LAbudtrans.pdf [he-
reinafter Index of Five Latin American Countries]. The Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities, a nongovernment organization based in Washington, D.C., launched its Open 
Budget Index in 2006 with the goal of scrutinizing fiscal transparency practices in differ-
ent countries around the world. Open Budget Initiative, About the Open Budget Initia-
tive, http://www.openbudgetindex.org/index.cfm?fa=about (last visited Apr. 8, 2009). 
For information on the history and goals of the Open Budget Index, see Int’l Budget 
P’ship, Transparency and Participation in the Budget Process: Why Focus on Budget 
Transparency and Participation, http://www.internationalbudget.org/themes/BudTrans/in 
dex.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Transparency and Participation in the 
Budget Process]. 
S 
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for? That is, what different meanings can be ascribed to this concept, and 
what political economic purposes does it advance? And, (2) what is the 
role of law and legal institutions in securing different visions of fiscal 
transparency? 
On the first point, a central argument of this Article is that the concept 
of fiscal transparency is not a neutral public good, but one that is open to 
a range of definitions that serve different interests. As has frequently 
been said about taxation, the (re)distribution of benefits and burdens 
through budgeting or fiscal policy processes is inherently political.4 Sus-
tainable budgeting requires negotiation of a legitimate, fair, and relative-
ly stable fiscal compact or bargain.5 
This Article offers a critical analysis of the meaning and purposes of 
fiscal transparency in light of developing international norms. It is ar-
gued that fiscal transparency norms as they are currently promulgated by 
most governments and international institutions focus primarily on fiscal 
discipline and on providing information to establish credibility for finan-
cial markets, international lenders, and aid donors. While these aspects of 
transparency are obviously important, they tend to ignore the political 
nature of the budget in both domestic and international contexts. In par-
ticular, this Article examines whether and to what extent fiscal transpa-
rency norms enable distributive justice and democratic participation in 
budget decision making by legislative and civil society actors. We find 
that these dimensions of transparency have been widely neglected in the 
design of prevailing norms. As a result, we argue, the “best practices” 
that currently dominate this field will be of limited help in generating the 
political consensus needed to ensure equitable development. These dis-
tributional and democratic deficits should concern all of us, but may be 
especially problematic for developing countries, for which issues of po-
verty reduction and economic sovereignty are most pressing. This Article 
also examines some alternative definitions of fiscal transparency that 
address these issues in a more meaningful way. 
Regarding our second key question, the role of law or legal institutions 
in securing different visions of fiscal transparency, we emphasize the 
                                                                                                                       
 4. U.N. DEP’T OF INT’L ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, WORLD ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
SURVEY 1997: TRENDS AND POLICIES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY, at 64–65, U.N. Doc.  
ST/ESA/256, U.N. Sales No. E/1997/50 (1997); Nicholas Kaldor, Will Underdeveloped 
Countries Learn to Tax?, 41 FOREIGN AFF. 410, 418 (1963). 
 5. MARGARET LEVI, OF RULE AND REVENUE 181 (1988). See generally SVEN 
STEINMO, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY: SWEDISH, BRITISH, AND AMERICAN APPROACHES 
TO FINANCING THE MODERN STATE (1993); Mick Moore & Lise Rakner, Introduction: The 
New Politics of Taxation and Accountability in Developing Countries, 33 INST. OF DEV. 
STUD. BULL. 1 (2002). 
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potential importance of fiscal transparency norms in empowering citizens 
to participate in establishing a fair and legitimate fiscal policy in their 
country, both through their representatives in a democratic legislature 
and more broadly. Here, we draw on theories of deliberative democracy 
in which laws play the important role of establishing the rules of en-
gagement in the decision-making process.6 As we see the budget as cen-
tral to political decision making about taxing and spending, we advocate 
for the expansion of budget transparency laws to fulfill this deliberative 
role, and we identify the shortcomings of current fiscal codes and norms 
in addressing transparency and accountability. We also inquire as to the 
practical role that law has played thus far in the spread and reform of 
budget transparency norms and in the establishment of “transparency” as 
an identifiable measure of good governance (however it be defined). This 
is a subset of a broader set of questions about the role of law in develop-
ment.7 We examine the importance of the “rule of law” and “good go-
vernance” in the fiscal context and consider what role budget transparen-
cy laws might play in a particular country’s “development” process. We 
identify a wide diversity of laws and practices concerning fiscal transpa-
rency in national and international contexts and ask to what extent it mat-
ters whether budget norms are “hard law” compared to “soft law” norms, 
administrative practices, or market incentives. 
The discussion of these overarching themes is organized into six Parts. 
In Part I, we analyze the reasons why fiscal transparency has surfaced so 
widely and insistently as a law reform issue at this particular juncture. 
Part II tracks the paths and networks by which these norms have been 
developed and transmitted globally, through initiatives at various interna-
tional and domestic levels. Part III takes a closer look at the content of 
fiscal transparency, according to the dominant model associated princi-
pally with the IMF. Part IV examines how various fiscal transparency 
codes and statutes deal with (or ignore) issues of distributive impact and 
politics. Part V analyzes democratic participation in the budget process. 
Part VI concludes with a discussion of the implications of this analysis 
for the broader project of “ruling the world,” including the role of law or 
norms and the implications for national and global governance. Recog-
                                                                                                                       
 6. See generally Philip Pettit, Depoliticizing Democracy, 17 RATIO JURIS 52 (2004). 
 7. The relationship between law and development has begun to be critically ana-
lyzed by many scholars after nearly two decades of “law reform,” which has frequently 
been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Kevin Davis & Michael Trebilcock, The Relationship Be-
tween Law and Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 895 (2008); 
David Kennedy, The ‘Rule of Law’ as Development, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: FACING 
COMPLEXITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 17, 22 (John Hatchard & Amanda Perry-Kassaris 
eds., 2003). 
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nizing that nation states remain the primary actors in formulating fiscal 
policy, we emphasize the need to design transnational fiscal norms that 
foster inclusive, democratic institutions at the country level, although we 
also identify the beginnings of an architecture that could provide an in-
clusionary framework for taxing and spending in the global context. 
I. THE ROOTS OF FISCAL TRANSPARENCY DISCOURSE 
Budgeting is a process for organizing government fiscal activities and, 
as such, it is as old as government taxing and spending. Prudence in fis-
cal management—in some commonsense way, matching expenditures to 
revenues—is the essence of budgeting. Just as budgeting has a long tradi-
tion, the basic principle of fiscal transparency, the notion that govern-
mental fiscal activities should be subject to public scrutiny, is not new. In 
this context, a central purpose of budgeting has been to ensure a degree 
of transparency, and therefore accountability, regarding the nature and 
quantum of public spending and taxation.8 The institutional and proce-
dural framework for raising, appropriating, spending, and accounting for 
public funds is typically laid out in a country’s constitution and financial 
management legislation, and supplemented by longstanding convention. 
In many developing countries, the “organic finance laws” are based on 
administrative practices that became entrenched during colonial times. 
They have generally been in place for several decades, though in practice 
these formal rules may not be fully implemented.9 
In the last decade, the term “fiscal transparency” has obtained currency 
as the banner for a host of policy initiatives designed to regularize bud-
geting practices and mandate the disclosure of specific information by 
governments around the world. In this Part, we explore the roots of this 
discourse on fiscal transparency, which has emerged so forcefully since 
the mid-1990s. We suggest it is linked to two broader trends that have 
affected both developed and developing countries: (i) the neoliberal turn 
in economic policy, which emphasizes fiscal discipline, and (ii) the 
movement to reform institutions to promote good governance. 
                                                                                                                       
 8. See Aaron Wildavsky, A Budget for All Seasons? Why the Traditional Budget 
Lasts, 38 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 501, 502 (1978). 
 9. Mike Stevens, Institutional and Incentive Issues in Public Financial Management 
Reform in Poor Countries 5 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 35106, 2004), available at 
http://www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/027 
/000090341_20060207162350/Rendered/PDF/351060Institutional0issues.pdf. 
802 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:3 
A. Fiscal Transparency and Fiscal Discipline 
As a defining aspect of the neoliberal turn in the 1980s, governments 
lost authority as economic decision makers and were subjected in various 
ways to more intensive forms of market discipline, in particular, reducing 
budget deficits.10 This included the discipline of credit-rating agencies, 
which directly impacted the cost to governments of financing a deficit, 
and the discipline of market analysts, who influenced where mobile capi-
tal would be invested. In developing countries, such market pressures 
were reinforced by explicit conditions imposed on concessional lending 
and aid. A review of IMF-supported fiscal reforms during the 1990s in-
dicates that their key elements were reducing government spending, 
downsizing the State, shifting expenditures from current to capital ac-
counts, and some provisions on safety net expenditures.11 In order to es-
tablish credibility with these increasingly powerful external audiences 
and allow them to assess investment risks, governments had to be more 
forthcoming with detailed information about country finances. 
In developed countries, the constraints on government action in eco-
nomic matters first became apparent in relation to monetary policy. De-
veloped States have fashioned various methods of institutionalizing 
monetary policy in such a way that, at least to some extent, it is taken out 
of the hands of elected governments.12 This is commonly done by dele-
gating the determination of interest rates to an independent central bank, 
now also a key plank of IMF recommendations for developing countries, 
because it is seen as a vital way to control inflation.13 Monetary policy 
also may be implemented through controls on exchange rates imposed in 
many developing countries (for example, countries may peg their curren-
                                                                                                                       
 10. See, e.g., Peter A. Hall, Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The 
Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain, 25 COMP. POL. 275, 285 (1993) (identifying a 
“shift” in the “locus of authority over macroeconomic issues” away from the Treasury 
and Keynesian economics towards monetarism, cemented under Margaret Thatcher and 
institutionalized through the 1980s and 1990s). See also Carl Emmerson, Chris Frayne & 
Sarah Love, Updating the U.K.’s Code for Fiscal Stability (Inst. for Fiscal Studies, Work-
ing Paper No. 04/29, 2004). 
 11. Int’l Monetary Fund, Fiscal Reforms in Low-Income Countries 4, Occasional 
Paper No. 160, Mar. 31, 1998 (led by George T. Abed). See also Allen Schick, The Role 
of Fiscal Rules in Budgeting, 3(3) OECD J. ON BUDGETING 2003, at 7–8. 
 12. Emmerson, Frayne & Love , supra note 10, at 4. 
 13. The IMF monitors monetary transparency and practices as well as fiscal transpa-
rency. In 1999, it released the Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and 
Financial Policies: Declaration of Principles. INT’L MONETARY FUND, CODE OF GOOD 
PRACTICES ON TRANSPARENCY IN MONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLICIES: DECLARATION OF 
PRINCIPLES (1999), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/mft/code/ [hereinaf-
ter IMF PRINCIPLES]. 
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cy to the U.S. dollar, or establish currency boards or capital import or 
export limits). Governments sought to establish the independence of this 
decision making, so as to credibly influence market expectations and 
thus “create conditions favorable to that level of inflation being rea-
lized.”14 For our purposes, what is most interesting about this institution-
al transformation is the need for governments to establish “credibility” 
with markets and their loss of authority as economic decision makers.15 
New Zealand was a pioneer in legalizing central bank control over in-
terest rates, during its massive economic liberalization in the 1980s. The 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989 established an independent bank 
and a “transparent” process of implementing interest rates “without inter-
ference from Government, Treasury, or anybody else,” which was 
claimed to have “no exact parallels anywhere else in the world.”16 Five 
years later, the same philosophy was applied to fiscal policy: 
[T]he key is transparency—indeed, chronologically it was the transpa-
rency in the Reserve Bank Act which inspired the idea of attempting 
something similar for fiscal policy. Government’s hands are tied only 
by the need to make policy intentions absolutely unambiguous to the 
public—surely a fundamentally sound principle.17 
Governments have not formally delegated their powers to set fiscal 
policy as they have for monetary policy. However, in the last decade, 
governments have placed a range of hard and soft law constraints on 
their own fiscal decision making. Why governments—in particular, 
elected governments—should agree to constrain themselves in this way 
is not obvious.18 The evidence suggests that for fiscal policy, as for mon-
                                                                                                                       
 14. Id. See also 2007 IMF MANUAL, supra note 2, at 26 (discussing monetary policy 
and central bank independence). 
 15. The financial crisis of 2008 and the global recession have shifted the balance of 
authority back to government decision makers in the short-term. However, we suggest 
that market mechanisms will remain dominant in the long-term. 
 16. Specifically, the goal of this Act was to “Muldoon-proof” monetary policy, a 
reference to the previous long-standing Prime Minister of New Zealand. Donald T. 
Brash, Governor of the Reserve Bank of N.Z., New Zealand’s Remarkable Reforms, 
Address to the Fifth Annual Hayek Memorial Lecture at Institute of Economic Affairs, 
London (June 4, 1996) [hereinafter Brash Speech] (also discussing the New Zealand 
fiscal responsibility reforms in depth). Begun in 1955, the Institute of Economic Affairs 
bills itself as rightwing and as “the U.K.’s original free-market think-tank.” Inst. of Econ. 
Affairs, About the IEA, http://www.iea.org.uk/record.jsp?type=page&ID=23 (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2009). 
 17. Brash Speech, supra note 16. 
 18. See Emmerson, Frayne & Love, supra note 10, at 4–6; Schick, supra note 11, at 8 
(asking, “Why have democracies accepted or imposed fiscal limits on themselves, and 
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etary policy, the desire to strengthen credibility vis-à-vis external au-
diences has been the driving factor and credibility regarding deficit con-
straint a constant theme.19 Trends to increase legislative control over 
budgeting, including the imposition of fiscal rules and other measures, 
have been identified as a reaction to concerns about “precarious” fiscal 
balances and about “losing the confidence of world credit markets.”20 
Schick claims that, prior to World War II, “virtually all democratic 
countries embraced the balanced budget rule, including some that often 
breached the rule or did not have any legal constraint on unbalanced 
budgets.”21 More recently, many States legislated fiscal caps that ex-
pressly require a balanced budget or place limits on permissible spending 
or borrowing, sometimes with schedules for deficit elimination. Exam-
ples include the expenditure ceilings introduced in many developed 
countries, such as Finland, Japan, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.22 In 
the European Union, the Maastricht Stability and Growth Pact (“Pact”) 
was established in order to stabilize and support the euro currency un-
ion.23 It requires Member States to “avoid excessive government defi-
cits” defined as planned or actual deficits above three percent of gross 
domestic product (“GDP”) and government debt above sixty percent of 
GDP.24 Article 104 of the Pact sets out the consequences for Member 
States that breach this requirement, which escalate in severity: comple-
tion of a confidential Commission report, a Council recommendation, 
publicity requirements, constraints on borrowing from the European In-
vestment Bank, a required deposit with the Community, and fines.25 A 
                                                                                                                       
why should we expect these limits to be effective when they run counter to the prefe-
rences of voters and politicians?”). 
 19. There have been a few suggestions to make fiscal policy “more like” monetary 
policy—a lever to be pulled in response to economic conditions—and thereby take some 
of the “politics” out of setting tax rates. See Nicholas Gruen, Greater Independence for 
Fiscal Institutions, 1(1) OECD J. ON BUDGETING 2001, at 89. So far, this path has not 
been taken up by either the international institutions or country governments. 
 20. Paul Posner & Chung-Keun Park, Role of the Legislature in the Budget Process: 
Recent Trends and Innovations, 7(3) OECD J. ON BUDGETING 2007, at 83; Schick, supra 
note 11. 
 21. Schick, supra note 11, at 15. 
 22. Isabelle Joumard et al., Enhancing the Cost Effectiveness of Public Spending: 
Experience in OECD Countries, 37 OECD ECON. STUD. 2004, at 120–23. 
 23. The Pact (establishing the European Community) creates a framework under 
which Member States “shall regard their economic policies as a matter of common con-
cern” and hence submit themselves to “multilateral surveillance” by the European Com-
mission and through it, by each other. Maastricht Treaty art. 103, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. 1992 
C191/6. 
 24. Id. art 104(c); Protocol annexed to the Pact, art. 1.  
 25. Id. art 104(c). 
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set of detailed procedural norms concerning data release and acquies-
cence to economic surveillance is laid down in resolutions, codes of con-
duct, and the conclusions and recommendations of the Economic and 
Financial Affairs Council.26 
However, experience with hard fiscal caps during the 1990s was often 
negative. Many studies demonstrate that these numerical restraints were 
frequently too rigid and were ignored, or worse, that they encouraged 
gaming, as governments tried to hide noncompliance through accounting 
changes or off-budget spending.27 The IMF has criticized the “perverse 
incentives” that such rules may generate if they are not backed by trans-
parent reporting “such that non-compliance can be easily detected and 
addressed.”28 
The IMF Code does not advocate the adoption of substantive fiscal 
caps. Instead, the Code discusses such fiscal rules as one possible element 
of an overall policy of fiscal transparency, stating that this discussion 
“should not be taken as an endorsement of the practices themselves.”29 
                                                                                                                       
 26. All of the resolutions and legal texts on the Stability and Growth Pact are available 
at European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_ 
finance/other_pages/other_pages12638_en.htm (last visited May 7, 2009). 
 27. At least some of this research took place inside the IMF, whose preoccupation 
with budget deficits is indicated by Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti. See Alberto 
Alesina & Roberto Perotti, Fiscal Discipline and the Budget Process, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 
401, 403 (1996); Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, The Political Economy of Budget 
Deficits (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4637, 1994), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w4637. See also James L. Chan, Major Federal Budget Laws 
of the United States, in BUDGET DEFICITS AND DEBT: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 17 (Sia-
mack Shojai ed., 1999); 2007 IMF MANUAL, supra note 2, at 40–42; INT’L MONETARY 
FUND, ANNUAL REPORT 1998, at 40 (1998) [hereinafter IMF 1998 ANNUAL REPORT]; 
Miguel Braun & Nicolás Gadano, What Are Fiscal Rules for? A Critical Analysis of the 
Argentine Experience, 91 CEPAL REV. 53 (2007); Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., 
Fiscal Sustainability: The Contribution of Fiscal Rules, 72 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 
117 (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/2/2483962.pdf [hereinafter 
OECD, Fiscal Sustainability]; Lisa Philipps, The Rise of Balanced Budget Laws in Cana-
da: Legislating Fiscal (Ir)responsibility, 34 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 681 (1996); Charles 
Wyplosz, Fiscal Policy: Institutions Versus Rules, 191 NAT’L INST. ECON. REV. 70, 74–76 
(2005); Allan Drazen, Fiscal Rules from a Political Economy Perspective 13–17 (June 9, 
2002) (Paper presented at the IMF World Bank Conference on Rules-Based Fiscal Policy 
in Emerging Market Economies, Oaxaca, Mexico, Feb. 14–16, 2002); George Kopits & 
Jon Craig, Transparency in Government Operations 2 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Occasional 
Paper No. 158, 1998). 
 28. 2007 IMF MANUAL, supra note 2, at 41. Similarly, the OECD suggests that more 
coercive fiscal rules, such as balanced budget laws or spending caps, may be ineffective 
unless accompanied by transparency rules that prevent governments from hiding certain 
expenditures off budget. Joumard et al., supra note 22. 
 29. 2007 IMF MANUAL, supra note 2, at 14–15. 
806 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:3 
Even the Pact’s strict three-percent fiscal deficit rule is dominated in 
practice by the various “soft” procedures for enforcement; the Council of 
the European Union uses these procedures primarily to enforce increased 
transparency, medium-term budgeting frameworks, and expenditure 
management processes among Member States.30 Information about na-
tional fiscal rules and institutions, including monitoring mechanisms and 
multi-annual fiscal frameworks, must be reported annually to the EU in-
stitutions.31 The Council has “recall[ed] the importance of domestic own-
ership, including the appropriate involvement of national Parliaments,” 
but the main audience for these significant “transparency” obligations 
seems to be the Commission and the Council; the finance ministers and 
economic policy makers of the other Member States; and financial mar-
kets. 
The notion of transparency does not on its face commit governments to 
restrain spending or deficits. However, as we show in Part II below, the 
need to establish credibility in the eyes of financial markets, donors, and 
investors has been a key driver of transparency initiatives. As one IMF 
staff member explained when promoting fiscal transparency to an au-
dience consisting largely of representatives from developing countries: 
In fiscal policy perhaps nothing matters quite so much these days as 
what the financial markets think you are doing and how well you are 
doing it, and to add to the financial markets I think you increasingly 
have to take into account the fact that the donors like to know what it is 
that a country is doing and how well it is doing it.32 
While prudent fiscal management has a commonsense appeal, what is 
less obvious on the face of the transparency debate are the constraints on 
taxation which, when combined with the spending constraints, have the 
ideological goal of restricting the overall size of government. Although 
the analogy between government and household budgeting is often made, 
there is a key difference: a government’s overall budget constraint is not 
set by any objective or external standard. What a government can raise in 
resources is limited only by its capacity and desire to do so. The budget 
constraint is itself a set of political choices, capabilities, and distribution-
al goals. In developed countries, there has been a trend towards reduction 
                                                                                                                       
 30. Press Release, Council of the European Union (Oct. 9, 2007), available at http://ec. 
europa.eu/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/council-october-2007_en.pdf [hereinafter EU 
Press Release]. 
 31. Id. at 10. 
 32. Barry Potter, Address at the Second Conference on the International Budget Pro-
ject: The IMF Transparency Code (Feb. 23, 1999), available at http://www.international 
budget.org/conference/2nd/imf.htm. 
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of taxes on capital and on mobile labor since the beginning of the 1980s, 
although overall revenue collections have remained high. In developing 
countries, the trend is more complex: it is accepted that tax collections in 
these countries need to be increased so as to enable proper provision by 
government, but a combination of economic globalization (especially the 
mobility of capital) and domestic distributional politics puts great pres-
sure on the ability of States to do so. We have written about the focus on 
fiscal deficits and the politics of tax reform elsewhere;33 however, it re-
mains an essential part of the neoliberal turn to which fiscal transparency 
norms can, in part, be traced. 
B. Fiscal Transparency and Good Governance 
The second major impetus for the new discourse on fiscal transparency 
came from changing ideas about governance that affected developing 
and developed countries in different ways. In the late 1990s, develop-
ment theorists and agencies began to emphasize the need to support insti-
tutional reforms or “good governance” in developing countries, as well as 
to strengthen initiatives to reduce poverty and address the social side of 
development. These ideas took hold in the wake of widespread dissatis-
faction with the neoliberal model, particularly the economic and political 
failure of structural adjustment programs in many developing countries. 
The U.N. Millennium Declaration of 2000 reflected these shifting atti-
tudes and laid out specific targets for reducing the number of people liv-
ing in extreme poverty and other measurable improvements in human 
welfare.34 The U.N. Financing for Development process examined how 
resources can be made available to achieve these goals.35 In 2001, a high-
level panel chaired by Ernesto Zedillo offered a series of Recommenda-
                                                                                                                       
 33. See Lisa Philipps, Discursive Deficits: A Feminist Perspective on the Power of 
Technical Knowledge in Fiscal Law and Policy, 11 CAN. J. L. & SOC. 141 (1996) [herei-
nafter Philipps, Discursive Defecits]; Lisa Philipps, Taxing the Market Citizen: Fiscal 
Policy and Inequality in an Age of Privatization, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111 
(2000); Miranda Stewart, Global Trajectories of Tax Reform: The Discourse of Tax 
Reform in Developing and Transition Countries, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 139 (2003) [herei-
nafter Stewart, Global Trajectories]; Miranda Stewart & Sunita Jogarajan, The Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and Tax Reform, 2 BRIT. TAX REV. 146 (2004). 
 34. United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/Res/55/2 
(Sept. 18, 2000). Notably, the Declaration states that creating “an environment . . . con-
ducive to development and to the elimination of poverty . . . depends on []good gover-
nance within each country . . . at the international level” as well as on “transparency in 
the financial, monetary and trading systems.” Id. art. III(12)–(13). 
 35. See generally International Conference on Financing for Development, Mar. 18–25, 
2002, Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development, U.N. Doc A/CONF.198/11 
(June 22, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/monterrey/MonterreyConsensus.pdf. 
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tions (“Zedillo Report”).36 The panel emphasized the need for public in-
vestments in education, health, nutrition, and other basic social pro-
grams: 
Financing an adequate level of social public expenditure while limiting 
budget deficits calls for substantial tax revenues. Most countries of the 
developing world must undertake significant tax reforms if they are to 
raise the additional revenue that they need.37 
The Zedillo Report further stated that developing countries themselves 
bear the primary responsibility for achieving growth and equitable de-
velopment, in part by “creating the conditions that make it possible to 
secure the needed financial resources for investment.”38 These conditions 
include “[f]irst and foremost . . . good governance that commands the 
consent of the governed, and effective and impartial rule of law—
including relentless combat of corruption . . . .”39 Budget transparency 
initiatives can be seen as part of this good governance agenda aimed at 
securing resources for development. As we discuss in Part V below, a 
second element of “governance” reform in both developing and devel-
oped countries has been an increase in consultation on policy reform and 
its implementation, a trend that can been seen as both a logical conse-
quence of increased transparency or information sharing and that has also 
developed as part of broader efforts to improve expenditure and tax poli-
cy outcomes. In sum, fiscal transparency laws are part of the shift to gov-
ernance in the global context of fiscal reform for development. 
                                                                                                                       
 36. U.N. High-Level Panel on Fin. for Dev., Report of the High-Level Panel on Fin. 
for Dev., Delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/55/1000 (2001), available at 
http://www.un.org/reports/financing/full_report.pdf [hereinafter Zedillo Report]. The Ze-
dillo Report was followed by a major U.N. Conference on Financing for Development. 
See International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mexico, Mar. 
18–20, 2002, Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development, 
U.N. Doc A/CONF.198/11 (2002). The Follow-up International Conference on Financing 
for Development to Review the Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus was held in 
Doha, Qatar from November 29 to December 2, 2008. Follow-up International Confe-
rence on Financing for Development to Review the Implementation of the Monterrey 
Consensus, Doha, Qatar, Nov. 29−Dec. 2, Doha Declaration on Financing for Develop-
ment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.212/L.1/Rev.1 (Dec. 2, 2008). 
 37. Zedillo Report, supra note 36, at 5. 
 38. Id. at 4. 
 39. Id. 
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II. THE GLOBAL SPREAD OF FISCAL TRANSPARENCY NORMS 
A. International Initiatives 
This Part tracks the emergence and spread of budget transparency 
norms since the mid-1990s through the interaction of transnational “soft 
law” with more conventional legal forms at the country level. While in-
ternational economic agencies have played a major role in this process, 
we find that they in turn have been influenced by government practices 
in certain developed countries, notably New Zealand. The normative un-
derpinning of international agency codes is often obscured by the appar-
ently neutral, procedural language of fiscal transparency. We also draw 
attention to the efforts of certain NGOs to reformulate budget transpa-
rency norms in order to advance an alternative fiscal politics in which the 
values of social equality and democratic legitimacy are more heavily 
weighted. 
1. The IMF 
In previous work, Stewart has documented the rising influence of in-
ternational financial institutions and their affiliated experts over domestic 
tax reform agendas, especially, but not only, in developing countries.40 A 
similar pattern of transfer from the international to the domestic level is 
clearly evident in the spread of fiscal transparency norms, and the IMF 
has taken the lead role in this process. 
The IMF’s work on fiscal transparency evolved directly out of its ef-
forts to promote budget discipline as a cornerstone of worldwide eco-
nomic policy. By 1996, however, the IMF had begun to stress that re-
forms to promote good governance, the rule of law, and public sector 
accountability were also needed in many countries to create conditions 
for the success of its economic policy prescriptions.41 At this early stage 
                                                                                                                       
 40. Stewart, Global Trajectories, supra note 33; Miranda Stewart, Tax Policy Trans-
fer to Developing Countries: Politics, Institutions and Experts, in GLOBAL DEBATES 
ABOUT TAXATION 182 (Holger Nehring & Florian Schui eds., 2007) [hereinafter Stewart, 
Tax Policy Transfers]; Stewart & Jogarajan, supra note 33. See also Allison Christians, 
Hard Law, Soft Law, and International Taxation, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 325, 331 (2007) (on 
the OECD). 
 41. See Press Release, Int’l Monetary Fund, Communiqué of the Interim Committee 
of the Board of Governors of the Internationall Monetary Fund, No. 96/49 (Sept. 29, 
1996), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1996/pr9649.htm [hereinafter 
IMF Press Release 96/49]; Int’l Monetary Fund, Good Governance: The IMF’s Role 3−4 
(Aug. 1997), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/govern/govern.pdf 
[hereinafter The IMF’s Role] (identifying issues of budget process and management as 
central to the IMF’s mandate and expertise). 
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of the governance revolution, the IMF advocated fiscal transparency 
primarily as a means of shoring up fiscal discipline and improving a 
country’s credibility with private investors. A critical 1996 declaration 
restated the IMF’s longstanding view that countries should aim for 
“budget balance and strengthened fiscal discipline in a multi-year 
framework” and added the following: 
Continued fiscal imbalances and excessive public indebtedness, and the 
upward pressures they put on global real interest rates, are threats to fi-
nancial stability and durable growth. It is essential to enhance the 
transparency of fiscal policy by persevering with efforts to reduce off-
budget transactions and quasi-fiscal deficits.42 
The link between transparency and fiscal restraint was further empha-
sized in an influential study paper by two senior members of the IMF 
Fiscal Affairs Department: 
Timely publication of a clearly presented budget document makes it 
easier for the market to evaluate the government’s intentions and allows 
the market itself to impose a constructive discipline on the government. 
Transparency increases the political risk of unsustainable policies, whe-
reas the lack thereof means that fiscal profligacy can go undetected 
longer than it otherwise would.43 
Initially the IMF sought to encourage fiscal transparency by incorpo-
rating governance concerns into its existing programs of country surveil-
lance, technical advice, and loan conditionality.44 In carrying out these 
long-standing functions, IMF staff were to impress upon country authori-
ties the “potential risk that poor governance could adversely affect market 
confidence and, in turn, reduce private capital in-flows and invest-
ment.”45 In 1997, the IMF moved to formalize its guidance on fiscal 
transparency in a detailed set of standards. This decision flowed directly 
from the Asian financial crisis and the sense of urgency it created about 
restoring market confidence.46 At a meeting in October 1997, executive 
directors debated the merits of having staff prepare a “brief manual of 
                                                                                                                       
 42. IMF Press Release 96/49, supra note 41 (emphasis added). 
 43. Kopits & Craig, supra note 27, at 2. 
 44. The IMF’s Role, supra note 41, at 6–9. 
 45. Id. at 7. 
 46. This decision was the result of the Asian financial crisis and the sense of urgency 
it created about restoring market confidence. Murray Petrie, The IMF Fiscal Transparen-
cy Code: A Potentially Powerful New Anti-Corruption Tool 4 (paper presented at the 9th 
International Anti-Corruption Conference, Durban, Oct. 10–15, 1999) [hereinafter Petrie, 
The IMF Fiscal Transparency Code]. 
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good practices for fiscal transparency.”47 While the report of this discus-
sion indicates that some directors had reservations, the staff was in-
structed to proceed, and the IMF’s first Code of Good Practices on Fiscal 
Transparency was approved in April 1998 (“Code”).48 Revised versions 
of the Code were published in 2001 and 2007, along with the extensive 
Manual on Fiscal Transparency (“Manual”), which provides detailed 
guidance to assist with “practical implementation.”49 
On publishing its first Code in 1998, the IMF stated the purposes of 
fiscal transparency more broadly than in earlier documents: 
The underlying rationale was that fiscal transparency could lead to better-
informed public debate about the design and results of fiscal policy, 
make governments more accountable for the implementation of fiscal 
policy, and thereby promote good governance, strengthen credibility, 
and mobilize popular support for sound macroeconomic policies.50 
The IMF’s interest in promoting public debate must be read skeptically, 
we argue, in light of its fundamental policy orientation towards fiscal 
discipline. Its early discussions of transparency show that the driving 
purpose was not to facilitate more informed and inclusive political bar-
gaining over budgetary decisions, but rather to help ensure that countries 
would stick to an IMF-approved set of fiscal policies, even in the face of 
domestic political protest.51 
The resolution approving the Code noted that it “does not imply a legal 
obligation on members.”52 Nonetheless, the IMF has taken concerted 
                                                                                                                       
 47. IMF 1998 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 27. 
 48. Id.; Press Release, Int’l Monetary Fund, Communiqué of the Interim Committee 
of the Board of Governors of the Internationall Monetary Fund, No. 98/14 (Apr. 16, 
1998), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1998/pr9814.htm [hereinafter 
IMF Press Release 98/14]. 
 49. Int’l Monetary Fund, Factsheet: How Does the IMF Encourage Greater Fiscal 
Transparency?, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/fiscal.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 
2009) [hereinafter IMF Factsheet]. See also 2007 IMF MANUAL, supra note 2; INT’L 
MONETARY FUND, FISCAL AFFAIRS DEP’T, GUIDE ON RESOURCE REVENUE TRANSPARENCY 
(2007), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/101907g.pdf. 
 50. IMF 1998 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 27. 
 51. For example, in their leading paper on fiscal transparency, Kopits and Craig ex-
plained its role in quelling popular protest as follows: 
Although fiscal transparency cannot guarantee consensus, there have been epi-
sodes (including recent ones) where a failure to prepare the population, through 
adequate and candid explanation, for the removal of a critical subsidy or of a 
labor market regulation has led to major unrest and jeopardized the improved 
economic performance sought by those measures. 
Kopits & Craig, supra note 27, at 2. 
 52. IMF Press Release 98/14, supra note 48. 
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steps to encourage compliance. As a result, the Code now exerts signifi-
cant normative pressure on policy makers in many countries. The IMF’s 
main implementation vehicle is the fiscal Report on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (“fiscal ROSC”). This is a module on fiscal policy 
incorporated into the ROSC process which is applied generally by the 
IMF to evaluate country compliance with a range of norms and stan-
dard.53 For example, in its 2001 fiscal ROSC on Brazil, the IMF com-
mented favorably on the country’s improved fiscal management and 
noted that “[t]he cornerstone of these achievements has been the enact-
ment in May 2000 of the Fiscal Responsibility Law which sets out for all 
levels of government fiscal rules designed to ensure medium-term fiscal 
sustainability, and strict transparency requirements to underpin the effec-
tiveness and credibility of such rules.”54 Formally, fiscal ROSCs are vo-
luntary, as countries must request an assessment by the IMF, and they are 
published only by consent.55 While many developed countries have un-
dergone the process, participation has been especially strong among de-
veloping countries seeking better capital market access, in part because 
the IMF’s published reports are used by credit-rating agencies and pri-
vate analysts to gauge investment risk.56 Moreover, the IMF indicated 
that it has sometimes incorporated the recommendations of fiscal ROSCs 
into loan conditionality for particular countries.57 The decision to under-
go or comply with the results of a fiscal ROSC cannot be seen as equally 
voluntary for all countries. 
It is our view that, globally, the IMF Code is the dominant model and 
it has had pervasive influence via several channels. The norm-
transmitting capacity of the Code has been magnified by the work of other 
transnational players in both the public and private sectors. This includes 
                                                                                                                       
 53. See 2007 IMF MANUAL, supra note 2, at 8–12. 
 54.  Int’l Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Dep’t, Brazil: Report on Observance of Stan-
dards and Codes (ROSC)—Fiscal Transparency Module 1, IMF Country Report No. 
01/217 (Dec. 2001). 
 55. By 2003, the IMF reported that “[fifty-four] fiscal ROSCs had been completed, of 
which [forty-eight] were published on the IMF website.” INT’L MONETARY FUND, FISCAL 
AFFAIRS DEP’T, ASSESSING AND PROMOTING FISCAL TRANSPARENCY: A REPORT ON PRO-
GRESS 4 (Mar. 5, 2003), available at http://imf.org/external/np/pdr/sac/2003/030503s2.pdf 
[hereinafter REPORT ON PROGRESS]. A more recent document indicates that “[a]s of 
March 2009, [eighty-eight] countries from all regions and levels of economic develop-
ment had posted their fiscal transparency ROSCs on the IMF’s Standards and Codes web 
page.” IMF Factsheet, supra note 49. 
 56. REPORT ON PROGRESS, supra note 55, at 9, 17. 
 57. Id. at 12–13. One example is Argentina, where a new Fiscal Responsibility Law 
was enacted in 2004, as a direct response to IMF requirements for institutional reform. 
See Braun & Gadano, supra note 27, at 60–62. 
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the World Bank, which has sometimes collaborated with the IMF in 
completing fiscal ROSC reports and has relied on them in its own work, 
in particular in developing aid and loan expenditure accountability me-
chanisms.58 The Code has also been promoted by the Financial Stability 
Forum (“FSF”), a group comprised of financial regulators from several 
developed countries, international financial institutions, and standard-
setting bodies, including the IMF.59 The FSF has urged “market practi-
tioners to take further account, when making lending and investment  
decisions, of jurisdictions’ observance of standards.”60 Private sector in-
vestment analysts do appear to use the Code in this manner, both by rely-
ing on IMF reports of country compliance and by applying the Code  
independently to evaluate fiscal transparency in countries for which no 
fiscal ROSC is available.61 Furthermore, there is some evidence that the 
Code is influencing the way donor countries deliver foreign aid. For ex-
ample, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development 
uses the Code along with other international standards to help it assess 
the risks of delivering aid directly through a government’s central budg-
et, as contrasted with aid tied to specific projects or administered by 
NGOs.62 The prospect of securing less conditional forms of international 
                                                                                                                       
 58. See World Bank, Poverty Reduction & Econ. Mgmt. Network & Int’l Monetary 
Fund, Fiscal Affairs Dep’t, Bank/Fund Collaboration on Public Expenditure Issues 20, 
Board Report No. 25763 (Feb. 14, 2003), available at http://www1.worldbank.org/ 
publicsector/pe/BankFundPERCollaboration.pdf. World Bank analysts have also used the 
2007 IMF CODE, supra note 2, as a benchmark for evaluating budget processes in devel-
oped and developing countries. See, e.g., Zhicheng Li Swift, Managing the Effects of Tax 
Expenditures on National Budgets 26–27 (World Bank Pol’y Research, Working Paper 
No. 3927, 2006). Note also the endorsement by G7 Finance Ministers in 1999. See gen-
erally World Bank & IMF, Bank/Fund Collaboration on Public Expenditure Issues 20, 
IBRD Report No. 25763 (Feb. 14, 2003), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/ 
external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/04/25/000094946_03041604014622/ 
Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf. 
 59. See Financial Stability Forum, History, http://www.fsforum.org/about/history.htm 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2009). See also FIN. STABILITY FORUM, UPDATE ON THE IMPLEMEN-
TATION OF THE FSF’S RECOMMENDATIONS: REPORT BY THE FSF CHAIRMAN TO THE G8 
FINANCE MINISTERS (2008), available at http://www.fsforum.org/publications/r_0806.pdf. 
 60. Fin. Stability Forum, Follow-Up Group on Incentives to Foster Implementation of 
Standards, Sept. 6, 2001, http://www.fsforum.org/publications/r_0109a.htm. 
 61. Murray Petrie, Promoting Fiscal Transparency: The Complementary Roles of the 
IMF, Financial Markets, and Civil Society 6–14 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 
No. 03/199, 2003), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp03199.pdf 
[hereinafter Petrie, Promoting Fiscal Transparency]. 
 62. See DEP’T FOR INT’L DEV., MANAGING FIDUCIARY RISK WHEN PROVIDING DIRECT 
BUDGET SUPPORT 8−10 (2002), available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/pfma-fiduciary 
risk.pdf. See also Norwegian Agency for Dev. Cooperation, Coordination of Budget Sup-
port Programs: Lessons from the Joint Macro-Financial Aid Program to Mozambique 5, 
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aid thus provides another impetus for developing countries to adopt IMF-
defined fiscal transparency norms in their domestic law and practice. 
2. The OECD 
Following the IMF’s lead, the OECD began work in 1999 on a set of 
Best Practices for Budget Transparency (“OECD Best Practices”), 
gleaned from the experience of member countries.63 The active involve-
ment of both the IMF and the OECD indicates the global sweep of fiscal 
transparency norms, encompassing developed and developing nations 
alike. As explained in Part I, like the IMF, the OECD’s interest in this 
subject is firmly rooted in its concerns about the prudence and sustaina-
bility of fiscal policy among its members. Though many OECD countries 
reduced their large deficits during the 1990s, budget balances are clearly 
at risk in the current financial crisis as well as because of the longer term 
spending pressures associated with demographic aging, such as health 
care and pensions.64 The OECD has predicted that the fiscal conse-
quences of aging populations will be “severe” in virtually all its member 
countries.65 From its perspective, the main purpose of transparency 
measures is to encourage spending restraint by revealing “the true cost of 
government activities.”66 
The OECD Best Practices notes that some countries have legislated 
fiscal rules while others have merely adopted policies or guidelines.67 It 
strikes a more skeptical tone than the IMF about the value of law reform 
per se, observing that “enforcing fiscal frameworks is a political economy 
issue as well as a technical one.”68 The OECD explains that its descrip-
tion of best practices “are not meant to constitute a formal ‘standard’ for 
budget transparency.”69 The OECD is not a funding body and does not 
have the same types of leverage over its members as the IMF, in the 
sense of imposing conditions on financial assistance. Nor does the 
OECD formally report on country compliance with the OECD Best Prac-
tices. Nonetheless, one of the purposes of the document is clearly to en-
courage reform and convergence at the country level: “[t]he Best Practic-
es are designed as a reference tool for Member and non-member coun-
                                                                                                                       
NORAD Report No. 2001/1 (2001), available at http://www.norad.no/items/1128/38/257 
4038865/0101coordination%20of%20budget%20support.pdf. 
 63. OECD Best Practices, supra note 1. 
 64. OECD, Fiscal Sustainability, supra note 27, at 117. 
 65. Joumard et al., supra note 22, at 117–18. 
 66. Id. at 127. 
 67. OECD Best Practices, supra note 1, at 122–23. 
 68. Joumard et al., supra note 22, at 130. 
 69. OECD Best Practices, supra note 1, at 7. 
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tries to use in order to increase the degree of budget transparency in their 
respective countries.”70  
Since 2003, the OECD has also engaged in a major research endeavour 
to collect detailed information about budget practices in member and 
selected non-member countries, through a questionnaire which covers 
many of the aspects of transparency addressed in OECD Best Practices.71 
The findings of this research are made public as a free electronic data-
base which has been used by academics to compare and rank the fiscal 
transparency of different countries.72 While it is difficult to measure the 
extent to which domestic policy makers, investment analysts, or other 
players are influenced by these rankings, their existence suggests that the 
OECD functions as another informal regulator of budgeting norms, 
though it plays a less direct role than the IMF.   
3. NGOs 
The concept of “transparency” has a venerable history among NGOs, 
particularly with respect to their work on corruption. Several nongo-
vernmental actors are making efforts at the international level to encour-
age and assess budget transparency in different countries. Perhaps the 
most prominent is the IBP of the Centre on Budget and Policy Priorities, 
based in Washington, D.C. In a study on who uses the IMF Code, Petrie 
reported that civil society organizations generally found it inadequate for 
their purposes and thus have developed their own modified standards.73 
For example, in the late 1990s, the IBP worked with the IDASA to for-
mulate an alternative budget transparency questionnaire for use in South 
Africa and several other African countries.74 The authors of the IBP re-
port offered a rationale for the study: “in the context of widespread po-
verty in the developing world, citizens and civil society organizations are 
                                                                                                                       
 70. Id. 
 71. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD BUDGET PRACTICES AND PROCE-
DURES SURVEY, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/45/39466141.pdf (the most 
recent version of the survey). Interestingly, while the survey includes questions about any 
substantive fiscal rules applicable in the jurisdiction (such as spending caps or balanced 
budget rules), it does not ask whether a country has enacted fiscal transparency legisla-
tion. Id. at 14.  
 72. The database was most recently updated in 2007, and can be accessed at http://web 
net4.oecd.org/budgeting/Budgeting.aspx. For rankings based on the database, see, for 
example, JAMES E. ALT ET. AL., FISCAL TRANSPARENCY AND FISCAL POLICY OUTCOMES IN 
OECD COUNTRIES (2003); Francisco Bastida & Bernardino Benito, Central Government 
Budget Practices and Transparency: An International Comparison, 85 PUB. ADMIN. 667, 
680, 684–85 (2007). 
 73. Petrie, Promoting Fiscal Transparency, supra note 61, at 20. 
 74. FÖLSCHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 3. 
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increasingly focusing on the budget and its effects on the distribution of 
resources, leading them to demand more and better budget informa-
tion.”75 Contrasting this explanation with the IMF and OECD emphasis 
on fiscal discipline and credibility demonstrates the range of different 
meanings and goals that can be attached to the concept of fiscal transpa-
rency. These different visions are also reflected in the specific criteria 
used to measure transparency at the country level, the subject of Part III 
below. 
The IBP also helped to initiate a comparative study of budget transpa-
rency in five Latin American countries.76 The study was designed and 
carried out by civil society groups and academics based in Latin Ameri-
ca, and it employed both a survey of expert participants in the budget 
process and a separate study of the legal framework for budgeting in 
each country. This methodology was chosen in order to assess “whether 
the lack of transparency is due to legal gaps or a deficient application of 
budget legislation.”77 Since the release of these regional studies, in 2006 
the IBP launched its more ambitious Open Budget Index (“IBP Index”), 
which examines budgeting practices in a large number of countries 
through a detailed questionnaire used by independent academic or civil 
society researchers to assess performance in each country.78 The most 
recent Open Budget Index, from 2008, surveyed eighty countries. In its 
final report, the IBP asserts that eighty percent of these countries fail to 
provide enough information to their citizens to ensure accountability, 
while fifty percent of these countries provide such minimal information 
that they can hide unpopular, wasteful, or corrupt spending.79 
It would be a mistake to treat NGO work on fiscal transparency as en-
tirely separate and distinct from that of the international financial institu-
tions. Certainly, the NGO focus on empowering local civil society 
                                                                                                                       
 75. Id. at 3. 
 76. See Index of Five Latin American Countries, supra note 3. 
 77. Id. at 1. The researchers found that while laws regulating the budget process ex-
isted in the region, they did not include mechanisms to promote citizen participation. Id. 
 78. Open Budget Initiative, Country Date Archives, http://www.openbudgetindex.org/ 
countryData/?fa=archive&pubdate=10/18/06 (last visited Apr. 8, 2009). For this report 
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 79. INT’L BUDGET P’SHIP, OPEN BUDGETS TRANSFORM LIVES: THE OPEN BUDGET 
SURVEY 2008, at 3 (2008), available at http://openbudgetindex.org/files/FinalFullReport 
English1.pdf [hereinafter OPEN BUDGET SURVEY 2008]. 
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groups to engage in the budget process means they are less preoccupied 
than the IMF or OECD with issues of economic stability and growth. 
However, the IBP does not present itself as opposing the IMF’s fiscal 
transparency campaign, but rather supplementing it with research and 
activism. The IBP is eager to point out that a consensus in favor of trans-
parency crosses a range of interests: 
[T]he idea of promoting open budgets is one that can gather support 
from a wide range of actors, leading to a coalition not available on other 
issues. Business interests often favor open budgets because they pro-
vide a better understood context in which to invest. International organ-
izations support them because they feel open budgets are essential to 
good governance. Civil society organizations favor open budgets re-
flecting their general support of more open and democratic societies. 
Governments find them hard to oppose.80 
Thus, the IBP and IDASA have lauded the IMF Code as “an important 
advance in efforts to promote fiscal transparency,” while also asserting 
that “it is limited, particularly when it is examined from the perspective 
of promoting participation in the budget decision-making process.”81 The 
IMF staff has participated in conferences of the IBP, and its Code has 
served as a starting point for IBP work. On the other side, there is some 
evidence that IMF personnel have begun to place some stock in the IBP’s 
findings about transparency for particular countries and to incorporate 
them into its analyses.82 This interweaving complicates the pattern of 
norm development at the transnational level, as it suggests a significant 
degree of collaboration among different policy networks or epistemic 
communities. 
4. Aid Donors 
Budget transparency and accountability also concern governments and 
institutions in their capacity as aid donors. As identified recently by the 
OECD, donors and the World Bank have put significant effort into 
strengthening and managing accountability for aid and project expendi-
ture and much less into budgeting in general, or tax policy and adminis-
tration in countries receiving aid.83 Several avenues have been developed 
                                                                                                                       
 80. Transparency and Participation in the Budget Process, supra note 3. 
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Stability in Latin America 22 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 07/220, 2007) 
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by country donors to strengthen and help manage public finances and 
fiscal policy in aid-recipient countries. 
First, the process outlined in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(“PRSP”) associated with conditional lending and debt relief comprises 
the central means by which the IMF and World Bank seek to consult 
with developing States, the poor, and other stakeholders with respect to 
expenditures, reforms, and general policy. As of March 2009, more than 
sixty-six countries have completed PRSPs since 2000.84 They are lengthy 
documents, running to several hundred pages. As stated by the IMF, the 
key goals of PRSPs are to “strengthen country ownership” and “enhance 
the poverty focus” of reform programs and to “provide for stronger col-
laboration” among the institutions, recipient countries, and other devel-
opment lenders and donors.85 
Second, the OECD, jointly with the Development Assistance Commit-
tee (“DAC”), the peak body for donor countries, have begun to monitor 
aid effectiveness, and in 2005 they established a program to monitor the 
use of harmonized standards to assess public financial management in 
aid-recipient countries; to provide training and share experiences; and to 
establish harmonized accounting standards for aid-recipient countries 
reporting on external assistance.86 
This monitoring process builds on the Public Expenditure and Finan-
cial Accountability (“PEFA”) program established in 2001, and is jointly 
financed by the European Commission, France, the IMF, Norway, Swit-
zerland, the United Kingdom (through its Department for International 
Development), and the World Bank (using its Development Grant Facili-
ty), , the United Kingdom (through its Department for International De-
velopment)87 PEFA’s goal is to strengthen both “recipient and donor 
                                                                                                                       
 84. Int’l Monetary Fund, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Mar. 9, 2009, http://www. 
imf.org/external/np/prsp/prsp.asp. Many countries have completed more than one PRSP. 
Id. 
 85.  Int’l Monetary Fund, Indep. Evaluation Office, Evaluation of the IMF’s Role in 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 14 
(2004), available at http://www.imf.org/External/NP/ieo/2004/prspprgf/eng.index.htm. 
 86. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: 
Ownership, Harmonization, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability (Mar. 2, 
2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf [hereinafter Paris 
Declaration]. The Paris Declaration was an international agreement to which over one 
hundred ministers, heads of agencies, and other senior officials adhered and committed 
their countries and organizations in order to continue to increase efforts in harmonization, 
alignment, and managing aid. This resulted in a set of actions and indicators capable of 
being monitored. 
 87. Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability, About PEFA—PEFA Program, 
http://www.pefa.org/about_pefamn.php (last visited Apr. 27, 2009). 
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ability” in order to assess the condition of (presumably recipient) country 
public expenditure, and procurement and financial accountability sys-
tems, generally termed Public Financial Management (“PFM”), and to 
develop reforms and capacity building in this area.88 
The PEFA framework replaces the previous Highly Indebted Poor 
Country framework for country financial assessment (so as to qualify 
countries for debt relief under that program) and is being used by the 
United Kingdom and some other States in their own donor assessments 
of countries.89 PEFA claims strong support for its framework for assess-
ing public financial management and suggests that the framework is likely 
to be sustainable into the future because of several factors, among others: 
(i) its wide support from international agencies (the members of the 
OECD DAC joint venture on PFM), (ii) its fast, global adoption, de-
spite the decentralized (country based) decision-making on if and when 
to use the Framework, [and] (iii) the agreement to implement repeat as-
sessments in many countries . . . .90 
One concern that has been widely aired over the last decade about re-
forms implemented in donor and lender-dominated processes has been a 
lack of country “ownership” of the reform. Ten years ago, this was de-
scribed in relation to conditionality-linked loan facilities of the IMF as 
follows: 
The one common theme that runs through perceptions of [the Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility] . . . is a feeling of a loss of control over 
the policy content and the pace of implementation of reform . . . . 
[T]here is broad agreement that ownership is a necessary condition of 
successful policy reform.91 
PEFA states that it aims for a significant level of “country ownership” 
of expenditure management policy and systems in order to reduce trans-
action costs for aid recipient and donor countries, and to increase donor 
harmonization (fragmentation of aid is described as a very significant 
                                                                                                                       
 88. Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability, About PEFA—PEFA Goals, 
http://www.pefa.org/about_pefamn.php (last visited Apr. 27, 2009). 
 89. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., BETTER AID: MANAGING DEVELOPMENT 
RESOURCES—THE USE OF COUNTRY SYSTEMS IN PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 52–58 
(2009). 
 90. Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.pefa.org/faqmn.php (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) [hereinafter PEFA FAQs]. 
 91. INT’L MONETARY FUND, REPORT OF THE GROUP OF INDEPENDENT PERSONS 
APPOINTED TO CONDUCT AN EVALUATION OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE ENHANCED STRUC-
TURAL ADJUSTMENT FACILITY (PART 2), at 20 (1998) (prepared by Kwesi Botchwey, Paul 
Collier, Jan Willem Gunning & Koichi Hamada), available at http://www.imf.org/external/ 
pubs/ft/extev/esaf2.pdf. 
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complicating factor for recipient-country budget processes). While sepa-
rate from the fiscal transparency and budget assessment processes, with a 
particular focus on expenditure and tracking of aid funds (and debt relief 
benefits), the PEFA framework has developed largely on account of in-
creased attention to country ownership and the move to include aid funds 
in a government budget rather than off budget.92 
Budget support requires donors to negotiate with a government about 
the overall budget expenditure process and administration through go-
vernmental mechanisms, in contrast to direct aid-to-project processes, 
which are administered and funded in communities by external agencies 
or nongovernment organizations. Most aid is provided directly on a 
project basis and hence is off budget. This presents real challenges for 
countries seeking to enhance budget transparency and accountability and 
also receiving large aid inflows, in particular, because these can be vola-
tile and uncertain unless there is a mechanism for centrally tracking all 
aid disbursements. The World Bank has begun to take the view that a 
country’s budget process is “the central institutional framework for exer-
cising choices on where resources should be channeled and for holding 
governments accountable.”93 The European Commission and World 
Bank aim to provide thirty percent of aid through long-term budget sup-
port.94 
Concerns associated with budget support as the mechanism for aid 
provision include fiduciary risk where financial management in a country 
is weak (especially, the risk that aid will be misappropriated), increased 
transaction costs for donors, and a strain on the capacity of the ministry 
of finance as the main coordinator of a variety of development priorities. 
However, the “emerging consensus among donors is that budget support 
is an approach better suited to countries with a good track record and . . . 
transparent budget management.”95 
The PEFA framework overlaps with the IMF fiscal ROSC process and 
with budget transparency norms. PEFA explains this as follows: 
                                                                                                                       
 92. BUDGET SUPPORT AS MORE EFFECTIVE AID? RECENT EXPERIENCES AND EMERGING 
LESSONS (Stefan Koeberle, Zoran Stavreski & Jan Walliser eds., 2006), available at 
http://www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2006/04/2
7/000090341_20060427100443/Rendered/PDF/359670Budget0Support01PUBLIC1.pdf. 
 93. Id. at 4. 
 94. See id. (providing a detailed discussion of recent experiences and issues). 
 95. Id. at 12. However, note that caution is required as the implementation of budget 
support can cause some perverse outcomes. See Philippa Venning, Impact of Budget Sup-
port on Accountabilities at the Local Level in Indonesia, 1 OECD J. ON BUDGETING 105 
(2009). 
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The mobilization and utilization of financial resources for the public is 
a most essential part of governance. Where transparency and accounta-
bility mechanisms are weak or lacking, poor people’s needs are often 
marginalized and development outcomes suffer. Several PFM analyti-
cal tools can help to promote transparency through publication of their 
findings, including in a PFM Performance Report. However, monitor-
ing is key to accountability . . . . The PEFA Framework can therefore 
provide an important part of a monitoring framework for governance.96 
B. Country Initiatives 
In this Section we shift the focus to the domestic level by charting the 
adoption of budget-related legislation in selected countries, seeking to 
uncover the historical process of norm creation and transfer. 
1. Developed Countries: New Zealand, Australia, and  
the United Kingdom 
The experience of these three countries is critical because it shows that 
ideas about fiscal transparency have migrated not only from the transna-
tional to the domestic level, but also in the reverse direction. All three 
countries were ranked above average in a recent study of country com-
pliance with OECD Best Practices, with New Zealand ranked “far and 
away” the best performing country.97 As we shall see, this may be be-
cause the OECD Best Practices follow the New Zealand design. Accord-
ing to this study, Australia ranks high on integrity, control, and accoun-
tability, but less high on budget reports and specific disclosures, while 
the United Kingdom ranks high on disclosures and accountability, but 
very low on budget reports (a mark which brings its average down).98 
Both the United Kingdom and New Zealand also rank very high in the 
IBP Open Budget Survey 2008 (as does the United States); ironically, 
Australia is not included in that Index.99 
As with monetary policy, New Zealand pioneered the design of budget 
transparency legislation with its Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994,100 a 
move that predated all of the international fiscal transparency codes. This 
                                                                                                                       
 96. PEFA FAQs, supra note 90 (follow hyperlink to question 1.2). 
 97. Bastida & Benito, supra note 72, at 680, 684–85. We consider the results of this 
study (one of the few comparative studies made to date) to be interesting, but to have 
significant limitations, including that it is based on country self-reporting through the 
OECD questionnaire process; and that it does not examine actual practice but the legal 
and administrative procedures in place. 
 98. Id. at 684–85. 
 99. OPEN BUDGET SURVEY 2008, supra note 79, at 7. 
 100. Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994, 1994 S.N.Z. No. 18 (N.Z.). 
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Act was highly innovative in that it sought to tighten fiscal discipline not 
through hard fiscal caps, but through procedural rules that stressed trans-
parency.101 It caught the attention of fiscal policy analysts in the interna-
tional agencies, and the New Zealand model quickly became a “bench-
mark” for defining fiscal transparency.102 
Australia and the United Kingdom followed suit by enacting compara-
ble statutes in 1998, the same year the IMF approved its first version of 
the Code.103 All three governments eschewed strict numerical limits in 
favor of procedural rules that mandated disclosure of the government’s 
fiscal policy agenda and actual results on an ongoing basis. The expe-
rience of these nations influenced the development and enforcement of 
fiscal transparency standards set by the IMF and OECD. 
For example, Australia took an early leadership role by conducting a 
detailed analysis of its own compliance with the IMF Code shortly after 
its adoption in 1998. IMF staff participated as independent reviewers of 
the draft report. The stated purpose of the whole exercise was to “contri-
bute to international financial reform” by “preparing a self-assessment 
report, providing a format and methodology that other countries may 
choose to follow.”104 Australia’s Charter of Budget Honesty emphasizes 
the publication of fiscal strategies, outlook and performance reports, and 
a long-term intergenerational report.105 Australia is said to have pio-
neered the medium term expenditure framework (“MTEF”) using multi-
year forward estimates as the starting point for considering governmental 
department bids for resources from the budget within the overall resource 
framework set by the government.106 This requirement is not contained in 
detail in the Charter, although it does require fiscal objectives and fore-
casting on a rolling three-year time horizon—in substance, an MTEF. 
                                                                                                                       
 101. See Angela Barnes & Steve Leith, Budget Management That Counts: Recent Ap-
proaches to Budget and Fiscal Management in New Zealand 2 (N.Z. Treasury Dep’t, 
Treasury Working Paper No. 01/24, 2001); Jon Janssen, New Zealand’s Fiscal Policy 
Framework: Experience and Evolution 2 (N.Z. Treasury Dep’t, Treasury Working Paper 
No. 01/25, 2001). See also GRAHAM C. SCOTT, GOVERNMENT REFORM IN NEW ZEALAND 
(1996); Marco Cangiano, Accountability and Transparency in the Public Sector: The 
New Zealand Experience (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 96/122, 1996). 
 102. See Kopits & Craig, supra note 27, at 37. The New Zealand legislation was hig-
hlighted as a novel approach in OECD, Budgeting for the Future 19–23 (OECD, Work-
ing Paper No. 95, 1997). 
 103. Charter of Budget Honesty Act, 1998, c. 22 (Austl.); Code for Fiscal Stability, 
1998, c. 36, § 155 (Eng.). 
 104. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., MAKING TRANSPARENCY TRANSPARENT: AN AUS-
TRALIAN ASSESSMENT at vi (1999), available at http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/178/ 
PDF/intro.pdf. 
 105. Charter of Budget Honesty Act, 1998. 
 106. Schick, supra note 11, at 18. 
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Overall, the budget is to be managed in accordance with “prudent” fiscal 
practice.107 
The United Kingdom’s Code for Fiscal Stability (“U.K. Code”) was 
approved by the Parliament under Section 155(7) of the Finance Act 
1998.108 New Zealand’s example and the IMF work on budget transpa-
rency both appear to have been important influences. However, perhaps 
most important was the goal of “signaling a commitment to sensible 
management of the public finances” by the new Labor government.109 
Chancellor Gordon Brown stated that the U.K. Code was intended to 
strengthen the openness, transparency, and “credibility” of fiscal poli-
cy.110 The U.K. Code does not impose explicit fiscal caps, but operates 
together with two nonbinding, “conventional” budget principles outside 
the U.K. Code.111 These principles are the “golden rule,” which states 
that the current budget surplus must be at least zero, or rather, there 
should not be a deficit over an economic cycle, and the “sustainable in-
vestment” rule, which requires the net debt to be maintained below forty 
percent of GDP in an economic cycle. 
The role of New Zealand especially suggests that fiscal transparency 
norms did not simply emerge from within the IMF, but were formed by a 
broader epistemic community that included policy makers from certain 
key developed countries. However, once a blueprint was codified at the 
international level, the IMF and OECD began using it to assess the budg-
et institutions and practices of many other countries facing a wide range 
of different economic challenges. As Rodrik observes, the use of such 
blueprints may be beneficial in enabling an efficient process of reform, 
but also carries risks if it overshadows local political processes that en-
sure local ownership, and effective design and implementation of re-
                                                                                                                       
 107. Charter of Budget Honesty Act, 1998, § 5. 
 108. The EU Stability and Growth Pact was also being developed at this time. See 
Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact, 1997 O.J. (C 236). 
Although the United Kingdom did not join the euro currency area (and hence is not re-
quired to adhere to the strict budgetary deficit rules established under the Maastricht 
Treaty), as a member of the EU, it monitors its compliance with the European Pact. Euro-
pean Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs—United Kingdom, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
economy_finance/eu_economic_situation/member_state8622_en.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 
2009). 
 109. See Emmerson, Frayne & Love, supra note 10, at 6. The Labour Party under To-
ny Blair and Gordon Brown was elected in a landslide victory in 1997. Blair’s Britain—
Blair’s Team Tackles Britain, BBCNEWS.COM, Dec. 26, 1997, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
special_report/for_christmas/_new_year/blairs_britain/39177.stm. 
 110. Code for Fiscal Stability, 1998, c. 36, § 155 (Eng.); Her Majesty’s Treasury, 
Chancellor Proposes Code for Fiscal Stability (Nov. 25, 1997), http://www.hm-treasury. 
gov.uk/prebud_pbr97_presshmt2.htm. 
 111. 2007 IMF MANUAL, supra note 2, at 53. 
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forms.112 In particular, according to Stevens, attempts to reform the pub-
lic financial management systems of developing countries by simply 
transplanting advanced-country best practices have often failed. Too of-
ten, such reforms do not jibe with the informal culture and traditions that 
have helped to stabilize the host State, or they require too much support 
from external consultants to be sustained over the long-term.113 
2. Developing and Emerging Countries: Nigeria, Pakistan,  
India, and South Africa 
During the last decade, developing and emerging countries have also 
begun moving towards establishing or reforming budget laws and fiscal 
frameworks. In adopting these laws, some countries were influenced by 
the policy directions of the IMF, either through conditionality-linked bor-
rowing or as part of the general surveillance process carried out by the 
IMF, including a fiscal ROSC. In other countries, in particular emerging 
economies and strong democracies like South Africa and India, a differ-
ent path has been taken towards establishing fiscal transparency laws, 
with some different outcomes in both the content and impact of these 
laws. 
(a) Pakistan and Nigeria: IMF-Linked Reforms 
In 2000, the IMF lamented in a review of Pakistan’s fiscal regime that 
“[t]he current legal framework does not make specific provision for re-
porting on performance or reporting to parliament or the public beyond 
the annual budget and annual accounts presentations.”114 It recommended 
that Pakistan consider “developing a Public Finance Act . . . giving ex-
plicit emphasis to performance and fiscal transparency.”115 Three years 
later, following a technical advice mission to Pakistan, the IMF reported 
that the country had made progress on transparency through several 
steps, including “preparation of a draft fiscal responsibility law.”116 Pa-
                                                                                                                       
 112. DANI RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES: GLOBALIZATION, INSTITUTIONS, 
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (2007), at 164–65. 
 113. Stevens, supra note 9, at 1–4. 
 114. INT’L MONETARY FUND, FISCAL AFFAIRS DEP’T, REPORT ON OBSERVANCE OF 
STANDARDS AND CODES: PAKISTAN—FISCAL TRANSPARENCY, ¶ 13, (Nov. 28, 2000), 
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 115. Id. ¶ 38. 
 116. REPORT ON PROGRESS, supra note 55, at 13. Additionally, there are other reports 
urging or praising the adoption of fiscal transparency legislation at the country level. See, 
e.g., Int’l Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Dep’t, United States: Report on the Observance 
of Standards and Codes—Fiscal Transparency, ¶ 1, IMF Country Report No. 03/243 
(Aug. 2003), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03243.pdf. 
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kistan’s Parliament subsequently enacted the Fiscal Responsibility and 
Debt Limitation Act 2005, which includes both substantive fiscal targets 
and transparency provisions requiring the government to make regular 
reports to the National Assembly.117 While domestic politics undoubtedly 
also played a role in bringing about this law reform, the IMF’s involve-
ment through its fiscal ROSC process is clearly evident. In this sense, 
Pakistan’s legislation can be viewed as a hard law manifestation of soft 
law promulgated at the transnational level. 
There is no published IMF fiscal ROSC available for Nigeria. Transpa-
rency and corruption have been and remain enormous problems in this 
country, particularly in relation to oil extraction. Although Nigeria has 
managed to pay down its international creditors and does not borrow 
from the IMF, domestic tensions about oil projects remain high. Howev-
er, in the last few years, there have been some developments relating to 
transparency, including the Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2007.118 First in-
troduced in 2004 by Finance Minister Ngolzi Okonjo-Iweala, this Act 
imposes only soft limits on deficits and debt.119 Its main focus is to  
improve transparency, for example, by requiring the government to set 
explicit fiscal targets over a three-year time horizon, and then to file 
quarterly reports on its own performance in reaching these objectives.120 
Although Nigeria is not publicly engaged with the IMF, its massive oil 
wealth has finally led to significant attention to the transparency of re-
source revenues. The Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initia-
tive report, prepared by an international auditor, was published in April 
2006,121 and Nigeria entered into a policy support instrument with the 
IMF in October 2005 (which ended in 2007, around the same time that 
the Fiscal Responsibility Bill received approval in the National Assem-
                                                                                                                       
 117. Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act, Gazette of Pakistan, No. VI, June 
13, 2005, at 115. 
 118. Nigeria: Yar’Adua Signs Fiscal Responsibility Bill into Law, THIS DAY, Nov. 8, 
2007, http://allafrica.com/stories/200711090303.html. 
 119. Fiscal Responsibility Act, § 12(1) (restricting annual deficits to no more than 
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lish” for PDF) (last visited Apr. 26, 2008). 
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bly). The policy support instrument is described by the IMF as a purely 
voluntary process in which a member country signs up for “more fre-
quent Fund assessments” of its economic and financial policies.122 It 
promotes a “close policy dialogue” between the IMF and the country, 
with the primary goal of “deliver[ing] clear signals on the strength of 
these policies.”123 The IMF explains: 
“Signaling” refers to the information that Fund activities can indirectly 
provide about countries’ performances and prospects. Such information 
can be used to inform the decisions of outsiders. Outsiders can include 
private creditors, including banks and bondholders, who are interested 
in information on the repayment prospects of loans; official donors and 
creditors, both bilateral and multilateral, who may be interested in reas-
surance about the countries they are supporting; and the public at 
large.124 
In its concluding review of the policy support instrument with Nigeria, 
the IMF highlighted the passage of the Fiscal Responsibility Bill as one 
of the structural reforms contributing to improved economic governance 
in the country.125 Nigeria’s engagement with the IMF suggests that its 
transparency initiatives are largely directed at outside investors, credi-
tors, and donors. Even so, the Nigerian Fiscal Responsibility Bill has 
been praised by Human Rights Watch126 and the Nigerian Budget Moni-
toring Group.127 While the new law may represent an important symbolic 
victory for those advocating fiscal governance reforms within the coun-
try, it remains to be seen whether this will translate into greater fiscal 
openness and integrity. 
                                                                                                                       
 122. Int’l Monetary Fund, Factsheet—The Policy Support Instrument, Nov. 2008, 
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(b) India and South Africa: Activism and NGOs Driving Reform 
India, which does not borrow from the IMF, is an example of a more 
homegrown fiscal transparency reform process. In 2003, the Indian fed-
eral Parliament passed the Fiscal Reform and Budget Management 
Act.128 This Act provides a substantive medium-term three-year fiscal 
target and imposes on the central government reporting requirements for 
strategies and outcomes.129 Section 6 states that the central government 
“shall take suitable measures to ensure greater transparency in its fiscal 
operations in the public interest and minimize secrecy.”130 According to 
the IBP, the push for greater budget openness in India started with grass 
roots civil society organizations tracking misuse of funds by local gov-
ernments.131 Yet here, too, the IMF promoted reform of budget practices. 
In its 2001 fiscal ROSC on India, the IMF commented that the country 
had “achieved a reasonably high level of fiscal transparency,” but that 
“[e]nacting the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Bill would 
be a major step forward given the emphasis it places on achieving a high 
standard of fiscal transparency.”132 
According to one recent study, South Africa ranks above average, and 
indeed, above the United Kingdom, in its compliance with OECD Best 
Practices on fiscal transparency.133 In particular, South Africa has a high 
ranking with respect to integrity, control, and accountability and a rea-
sonable ranking for budget reports and disclosures.134 South Africa has a 
substantial and informative budget website for its National Treasury, in-
cluding guides to the national budget in Afrikaans, English, Tswana, 
Xhosa, and Zulu.135 The website also sets out the core goals of the Trea-
sury: 
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Supporting efficient and sustainable public financial management is 
fundamental to the promotion of economic development, good gover-
nance, social progress and a rising standard of living for all South  
Africans. The Constitution of the Republic (Chapter 13) mandates the 
National Treasury to ensure transparency, accountability and sound fi-
nancial controls in the management of public finances. 
. . . Over the current medium-term expenditure framework period 
(2007–2009) the National Treasury will focus on sustaining growth and 
macroeconomic stability, while accelerating development and the crea-
tion of employment opportunities.136 
The high level of fiscal transparency in South Africa seems to have 
been largely a response to NGO or civil society action during the late 
1990s (after establishment of the new State in 1994). The Budget Infor-
mation Service of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa and the 
IBP produced a report on transparency and participation in South Afri-
ca’s budget process, which was released in October 1999, and revised in 
2000.137 Around the same time, South Africa followed Australia’s exam-
ple and successfully introduced a medium-term expenditure framework 
that remains part of its budgetary process today.138 We suggest that the 
reasons for the relatively successful implementation of this constraint 
include its connection with the local activist push for fiscal transparen-
cy.139 South Africa’s engagement in the IMF fiscal ROSC process in 
2001 was not the key influence on South African reform. South Africa 
now appears to have satisfied the IMF on its transparency score—such 
that the IMF’s most recent country report, from 2007, does not once 
mention transparency as an issue or goal for South Africa.140 
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III. THE CONTENT OF FISCAL TRANSPARENCY NORMS 
Fiscal transparency is generally discussed as a neutral procedural norm 
that will produce better or more predictable fiscal policy. We argue that 
transparency standards have more normative content than their usual 
treatment suggests and may serve different constituencies and substan-
tive policy ends depending on the types of disclosure and processes they 
require. Analysis of the IMF Code reveals a much larger “wish list” of 
desirable practices for governance, subsumed under the overall banner of 
fiscal transparency. While we will not set out exhaustively all of the ele-
ments of fiscal transparency as proposed by the various international 
codes and national laws and policies, it is useful to survey and discuss 
key elements of the IMF Code as the dominant model, as well as selected 
features of the OECD Best Practices. 
A. Rule of Law and Structure of Government 
The first section of the IMF Code (and accompanying Manual) empha-
sizes the “[r]oles and [r]esponsibilities” of government, in particular, es-
tablishing clear, public rules about the structure and fiscal powers and 
responsibilities of legislative, executive, and judicial branches of gov-
ernment; setting out the relationship between government and public 
corporations; and overseeing the relationship between government and 
private enterprise with respect to the public availability of contractual 
arrangements.141 In addition, the Code requires governments to publish 
comprehensive, understandable budget, tax, and other public finance 
laws; set forth regulations and administrative procedures relating to the 
collection, commitment, and use of public funds; and provide the ability 
to appeal tax and nontax obligations, and an explicitly legal basis for the 
management of government assets and liabilities.142 
The IMF appears, in this first section of the Code, to require member 
countries to establish a solid constitutional framework for government, 
together with property and contract rights, in a way that is recognizably 
“Western” in form. The Code steers clear of requiring “democracy,” but 
it assumes a legislature and the separation of powers, including a legal 
basis for the power to tax; a legal basis for resource distribution and  
public-private contracting; a working judiciary and appeals system; and a 
clear legal definition of public property and public debt. The requirement 
for clear rules on taxation implicitly assumes private property (i.e., there 
must be something to tax). Thus, the “legal institutions” of property and 
contract are embedded in this part of the Code, and the necessity for a 
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clear demarcation of public and private realms inscribes the market into 
the very structure of the State. 
This first section also makes clear that the IMF places considerable 
emphasis on the role of national laws in securing fiscal transparency. The 
Code states generally that “[t]he collection, commitment, and use of pub-
lic funds should be governed by comprehensive budget, tax, and other 
public finance laws, regulations[,] and administrative procedures.”143 The 
Manual more clearly endorses the concept of fiscal transparency legisla-
tion or other legislated fiscal limits: 
These arrangements generally support fiscal transparency by providing 
a clear statement as to policy objectives and how these objectives will 
be achieved, including informing the public of fiscal risks. One func-
tion of these laws is to help build support for fiscal consolidation by 
strengthening the credibility of fiscal policies and by increasing ac-
countability.144 
Thus, the IMF evidences considerable faith in law as delivering the “go-
vernance” limb of development and in its use for the formalization of 
essentially political and economic processes. 
A study by Isabelle Joumard and others for the OECD noted that some 
countries have legislated fiscal rules while others have merely adopted 
policies or guidelines.145 The authors appear less persuaded than the IMF 
about the value of law reform per se in the absence of political will, ob-
serving that “enforcing fiscal frameworks is a political economy issue as 
well as a technical one.”146 Nonetheless, they identify how many coun-
tries have implemented fiscal transparency laws as a mechanism for im-
proving fiscal discipline and policy outcomes, as seen in Part II. 
B. Budget Process and Fiscal Objectives 
The second key element of the IMF Code is a requirement for “open 
budget processes” that “follow an established timetable” and are “guided 
by well-defined macroeconomic and fiscal policy objectives.”147 In par-
ticular, the Code requires 
• adequate time for a draft budget to be considered by the legisla-
ture; 
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2009] FISCAL TRANSPARENCY 831 
• a “realistic” budget presented in a medium-term framework and an 
assessment of “fiscal sustainability” setting out the main assump-
tions and sensitivity analysis (for estimated errors); 
• a clear statement of any fiscal targets or rules; 
• a description of major expenditure and revenue measures lined to 
policy objectives and with estimates of impact on the budget and 
the economy; 
• clear mechanisms for coordination of budget and off-budget activi-
ties; and 
• an effective accounting system for monitoring and tracking reve-
nues, commitments, liabilities, and assets, including a timely mi-
dyear report and account auditing presented to the legislature and 
published within a year of the budget.148 
These requirements for open and timely budget information are clearly 
essential for a legislature and for citizens to participate adequately in the 
budget process. Similarly, effective accounting of revenues and the set-
ting out and costing of expenditure goals are crucial. Both of these ele-
ments support democratic participation in budgeting as well as donor or 
lender review of a government’s fiscal position. 
The concept of a “realistic” budget appears to relate primarily to the 
economic assumptions in the budget and assumptions about revenue pro-
jections and “targets” set out in multi-year development plans.149 Reve-
nue forecasting150 is notoriously difficult even for developed countries, 
except for the rule of thumb that a good starting point for predicting rev-
enues in a given year is the revenues achieved in the prior year. Treasu-
ries of developed countries, including that of the United Kingdom, have 
been criticized for under-estimating tax revenues, in particular corporate 
tax revenues.151 Developing countries may be too optimistic about reve-
nue estimates, in particular where they are striving to increase “tax ef-
fort.” Both of these tendencies may be based on politics as well as statis-
tics. 
Both the IMF and the OECD emphasize that the creation of formal 
procedures takes a substantial period of time. In addition to preparing the 
advance provision of draft budgets and policies (several months before 
the year commences), a government must plan a medium-term frame-
work beyond the fiscal year and manage “sustainably” over the long- 
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term—usually a time well beyond a normal democratic electoral cycle.152 
In particular, the MTEF (or the similar notion of a medium-term budget 
framework) has been most often proposed as an external “blueprint” for 
reform, and the IMF contends that it is essential for fiscal transparen-
cy.153 
However, even the IMF acknowledges how difficult establishing a 
plausible and sustained MTEF can be. The IMF Manual points to success-
ful implementation in Australia, Brazil, Chile, and the United Kingdom. 
Nonetheless, the IMF underlines the necessity for “stringent conditions”; 
“robust revenue forecasts”; “rigorous” connections between target ex-
penditures and the expected economic prospects over time; and “clearly 
defined and fully costed policy proposals.” It emphasizes that a medium-
term framework is “most likely to be effective in the context of a real, 
stable, transparent, and well-publicized commitment to fiscal control.”154 
These conditions are very challenging for developing countries with poor 
systems, under-staffing, and low government commitment.155 
It is also interesting to note the mechanisms for coordinating “on-
budget” and “off-budget” items. Clearly, if we see the budget as a central 
element of democratic governance, expenditures should be largely “on-
budget.” However, it is often the case that various items are “off-budget,” 
such as pension entitlements and special purpose funds. Furthermore, as 
discussed above, most aid for developing countries is currently delivered 
off-budget. It is laudable that the IMF calls for “a strong interface be-
tween the government’s national planning or development framework 
(e.g. Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) and the medium-term budget.”156 
If aid flows are also accounted for in this overall framework, it may im-
prove management and coordination of aid and other revenues and 
spending. However, on the whole, the IMF Code as it is currently drafted 
cannot address the issue of accountability of aid flows; these issues are 
outside the scope of its fiscal transparency framework. 
C. Public Budget Documentation 
The third key element of the IMF Code is a requirement for timely 
publication of all budget documentation, especially of fiscal information. 
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Again, this is to be a “legal obligation” upon a government. In particular, 
the IMF looks for the following: 
• the release of information in advance and the publication of out-
comes for at least the two preceding years and forecasts for at least 
the two following years; 
• tax expenditure statements and explanation of quasi-fiscal activity 
and other fiscal risks; 
• reporting fiscal data on a gross basis, including separate identifica-
tion of receipts from all revenue sources such as taxes, resource-
related activities, foreign aid, information about expenditures and 
debt, other significant liabilities (e.g., pensions), and natural re-
source assets; 
• reporting subnational government budgets and public corporation 
positions; 
• a periodic report on long-term public finances; 
• wide distribution of a “clear and simple summary guide” at the 
time of the annual budget; 
• reporting overall balance (fiscal deficit or surplus) and gross debt 
of government for the period; and 
• reporting on an annual basis results linked to objectives of major 
budget programs.157 
Few would disagree that publicizing such information benefits a wide 
range of social interests. Indeed, the IBP argues that many governments 
could significantly improve fiscal transparency simply by making availa-
ble to the public the budget information they already collect for donors or 
for internal government purposes.158 However, some controversy sur-
rounds the requirement to report on long-term finances, because of the 
virtual impossibility of making accurate cost or revenue predictions over 
a long horizon, which creates a risk that such reports will do more to 
mislead than to inform. Neil Buchanan, for instance, has argued that 
long-term forecasting, also known as “generational” accounting, tends to 
raise false fears that social programs are unaffordable over the long-term 
or will be excessively burdensome to future generations.159 To this we 
would add that requiring such a report goes beyond simple disclosure. It 
also directs fiscal policy makers to gather, analyze, and consider particu-
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lar kinds of information focused on the longer term, and tends to over-
emphasize the values of fiscal prudence and discipline. These values are 
further reinforced by the need to disclose aggregate budget balance and 
debt. In contrast, it is striking that neither the IMF Code nor the OECD 
Best Practices call for disclosure of any specific information about the 
distributive impact of the annual budget or fiscal policy for the current 
population. The content of tax expenditure reports, for example, is either 
left to governments to determine or weighted toward the types of infor-
mation that will expose any risk of fiscal imbalance. 
D. Integrity of Data and Bureaucracy 
The fourth element of the IMF Code encompasses a number of differ-
ent strands that concern the integrity of data and bureaucracy. The IMF 
calls for measures to secure the quality of fiscal data.160 These include 
forecasts, indication of the cash or accrual accounting basis, and the ap-
plication of “generally accepted accounting standards” for the public sec-
tor in a manner that is internally consistent and reconciled with other data 
sources.161 The Code also proposes internal and external auditing of gov-
ernment activities and finances. These data and accounting criteria draw 
heavily on the establishment and dissemination of global accounting 
standards for both public and private bodies—integrating the “fiscal 
transparency” norm-development process into a wider network. 
The IMF also calls for clear ethical standards for public servants and 
publication of their conditions of employment. And concerning procure-
ment, it demands purchase and sale of public assets and major transac-
tions; independence of the revenue authority from political direction; 
protection of taxpayer rights; and regular reporting to the public by the 
revenue authority.162 Here, the IMF Code overlaps with the very consi-
derable work that international institutions responding to corruption have 
undertaken in the last decade. 
The reference to an independent revenue authority has a long history in 
the IMF and its reform recommendations for developing countries. The 
OECD has recently noted that the establishment of autonomous revenue 
authorities has been a “high-profile innovation, and a particular focus for 
donor support,” and about thirty such authorities have now been estab-
lished in developing countries, mostly in Africa and South America.163 
However, as the OECD has also observed, experience in successfully 
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establishing an “autonomous” agency independent of political interfe-
rence has been mixed and “early gains have been hard to sustain.”164 As 
“tax collection cannot be entirely divorced from making tax and budget 
policy,” reporting lines to the executive government must be carefully 
established.165 
Even more recently, a new emphasis on taxpayer rights, as opposed to 
merely strengthening the revenue authority, is welcome, as this can help 
establish a sounder political basis for participation in taxing and spend-
ing.166 This seems to be one way in which the IMF has (indirectly) ac-
knowledged the need for active engagement and protection of taxpayers, 
albeit it proposes this in the quite limited context of engagement with the 
revenue authority, rather than the budget process more broadly. 
In this Part, we have reviewed the main features of the IMF model and 
have pointed out that it does far more to promote values of fiscal pru-
dence, discipline, and integrity than to support other possible goals of 
transparency, such as equity or democratic oversight. No one could se-
riously protest that prudence, discipline, and integrity are unimportant—
they are clearly imperative to all citizens, including those concerned with 
improving the fairness and democratic oversight of budgets. This is re-
flected in the fact that independent watchdogs such as the IBP and 
IDASA have incorporated many of the IMF’s budget transparency re-
quirements. However, as discussed in the next Part, these groups have 
supplemented the IMF standards with their own criteria related to social 
equality and democracy. 
IV. FISCAL TRANSPARENCY AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
Distributive politics are at the heart of fiscal policy because they will 
often make or break the viability of a reform. For this pragmatic reason, 
if no other, the omission of distributive analysis from the dominant mod-
el of fiscal transparency is problematic. We also consider it to be trouble-
some, though, for the establishment of fairness in principle. 
As already noted, there is no requirement in the IMF Code or OECD 
Best Practices for governments to report on how fiscal policy decisions 
impact different income groups or segments of the population. However, 
in the most recent version of the Manual that accompanies the IMF 
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Code, the IMF does briefly acknowledge that fiscal discipline may in-
volve political tradeoffs that ideally should be disclosed: 
Reforms aimed at reducing fiscal deficits and improving macro stabili-
ty, or at enhancing efficiency, may affect different income and social 
groups differently, and may hurt or benefit vulnerable and low-income 
groups more than others. It is important for transparency that some as-
sessment of these impacts be included in the budget documentation . . . . 
Poverty and Social Impact Analysis refers to the analysis of the distri-
butional impact of policies and policy reforms on the welfare of differ-
ent groups, with a specific emphasis on the poor and vulnerable . . . . 
Good practice would require that budget documentation include at least 
a simple analysis of the differential impacts of new policies and meas-
ures.167 
The addition of this commentary may reflect the IMF’s sensitivity to 
criticisms of its structural adjustment programs and the need to acknowl-
edge the turn in development discourse often found in its own policy ad-
vice. However, it is important to note that the Manual is 124 pages long 
(plus glossary and references), and these passages only briefly interrupt 
an otherwise unrelenting focus on fiscal discipline and integrity.168 Nor 
do they impose more than a minimal obligation to include some basic 
analysis of distributional impact. Most importantly, these recommenda-
tions are not reflected in the Code itself. The reason may have to do with 
concerns that this type of information will increase the likelihood of po-
litical resistance to tough decisions about spending restraint or taxation, 
challenging the ability of governments to deliver on their promises of 
fiscal prudence. As Heald discusses, one view is that “‘too much’ trans-
parency produces ‘over-exposure,’ leading to losses in effectiveness 
through high levels of transaction costs and excessive politicization.”169 
Unsurprisingly, NGOs involved with budget transparency have placed 
social equity issues higher on the agenda. In developing the IBP Index, 
the IBP states that IMF standards “do not go far enough to ensure that 
budgeting is responsive and accountable to citizens.”170 To redress this, 
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the IBP’s survey questionnaire includes the following questions, to be 
answered on a transparency scale of one to five: 
55. Does the executive’s budget or any supporting budget documenta-
tion present information on policies (both proposals and existing com-
mitments) in at least the budget year that are intended to benefit direct-
ly the country’s most impoverished populations? . . . 
. . . . 
57. Does the executive make available to the public an analysis of the 
distribution of the tax burden? . . . 
. . . . 
65. Are citizens able in practice to obtain non-financial information re-
lated to expenditures (for example, number of beneficiaries, number of 
persons employed by the program, etc.) for individual programs in a 
format that is more highly disaggregated than that which appears in the 
executive’s budget proposal if they request it from a ministry or agen-
cy? . . . 
. . . . 
109. Does the year-end report explain the difference between the 
enacted level of funds intended to benefit directly the country’s most 
impoverished populations and the actual outcome? . . .171 
In addition, the IBP asks numerous questions about availability of infor-
mation to citizens and recommends that the right to obtain not only 
budget documents but also detailed information about particular program 
expenditures at the local level be established by legislation.172 
An earlier 2001 study of budget transparency in Latin American coun-
tries also highlighted the connection of transparency to social equity, 
stating that “knowledge and analysis of the budget should be sufficient to 
make it possible for the external observers to verify whether the distribu-
tion of . . . resources and their application reflect social preferences and 
comply with the criteria of equality and justice.”173 Notably, however, 
this survey instrument did not include direct questions about the availa-
bility of distributive information related to budget policies. Instead, these 
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issues were addressed indirectly through numerous questions about citi-
zen access to and influence over the budget process.174 This approach has 
remained consistent in two follow-up studies, the most recent of which 
adopts a more politically neutral definition of transparency, but also 
states that “[a]pplied budget analysis . . . makes it possible to evaluate 
who wins and who loses with the distribution of public resources.”175 
In South Africa, the collaborative 1999 study by the IBP and IDASA 
concluded, among its many findings, that “analysis of tax incidence is 
lacking”176 in South Africa’s budget documentation. The report recom-
mended that detailed information on spending allocations be provided to 
Parliament earlier in the budget process and cited the lack of consistent 
and detailed data as a barrier to oversight of budgets by civil society.177 It 
also described the limited but growing role of civil society groups in 
meeting with parliamentary committees to discuss issues such as the 
priorities of low-income people and women, as well as sectionalized so-
cial welfare.178 
Like the IMF and OECD, these NGOs have attempted to articulate 
global standards of fiscal transparency that can be applied to evaluate 
country practice and create pressure for reform. The NGOs have taken 
some modest steps to add a distributive lens to the assessment of fiscal 
transparency, while also confirming the importance of reliable informa-
tion regarding the government’s fiscal prudence and integrity. It must be 
acknowledged that analysis of distributional incidence of taxes and 
spending may be difficult, especially for countries with a low analytical 
capacity in government.179 However, such difficulties also arise with rev-
enue estimating, forecasting, and the establishment of credible medium-
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term budget frameworks, which are nonetheless explicitly included in the 
IMF Code. 
Budget transparency legislation at the country level has tended to track 
the IMF and OECD approaches—it generally makes no explicit refer-
ence to social justice indicators. For example, the Australian Charter re-
quires an assessment of distributional impact not for current generations, 
but for future ones alone. One exception is the U.K. Code for Fiscal Sta-
bility, which includes fairness as one of the principles that must govern 
fiscal policy. It defines “fairness” as follows: “[t]he principle of fairness 
means that, so far as reasonably practical, the Government shall seek to 
operate fiscal policy in a way that takes into account the financial effects 
on future generations, as well as its distributional impact on the current 
population.”180 The mandate to consider future generations relates back 
to the issue of discipline over current social spending. However, the ref-
erence to distributional impact on the current population at least creates 
an opening for scrutiny of the distributive impact of budgets. This poten-
tial is not realized in practice, because none of the requisite public re-
ports under the Code must include a distributional analysis. According to 
a 2004 report, the U.K. Treasury has, on some occasions, provided in-
formation about the impact of its proposals on different income 
groups.181 The report recommends making this mandatory: 
There is no reason why the Code . . . should not contain an explicit re-
quirement that, where significant and possible, the distributional impact 
on the current population of new measures should be made publicly 
available. Similarly estimates of the impact on marginal deduction rates 
across the whole population should also be provided . . . . It is also de-
sirable that indicative information be provided as early as possible in 
the consultation process rather than simply being provided when all of 
the details of the policy have been finalized.182 
The obvious problem with giving governments discretion to publish 
such information selectively is that they will tend to do so only when it is 
politically convenient. Even if distributive analyses were required for all 
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new policies, though, there is concern about how to ensure a degree of 
rigor and objectivity in the way such data is presented. This points to the 
need for effective oversight of the executive by legislative and civil so-
ciety actors, which we discuss in the next Part. 
In Pakistan, the transparency provisions of the Fiscal Responsibility 
and Debt Limitation Act of 2005 are based on the IMF Code and do not 
require disclosure of any distributional data.183 However, equity issues 
are addressed in a different way. The statute’s deficit and debt reduction 
targets are subject to an exception for “social and poverty alleviation re-
lated expenditures,” which are not to fall below 4.5% of GDP in any giv-
en year.184 The term “social and poverty related expenditure” is defined 
to include, inter alia, health, education, and “such other expenditures as 
may be specified in the National Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper from 
time to time.”185 The government must report on its compliance with 
these objectives in an annual fiscal policy statement; some account must 
be given as to the amount of budgetary spending that qualifies as “social 
and poverty related.”186 The IBP reported in 2008 that Pakistan’s budget 
did include information “highlighting the impact of key policies intended 
to alleviate poverty, but some details are excluded.”187 However, the IBP 
report indicates that the Pakistani government does not publicize any 
analysis of the distribution of the tax burden.188 
Tax expenditures are one aspect of fiscal policy that cries out for more 
open distributive analysis. The IMF Code recommends that tax expendi-
tures be reported in the budget documents, but does not prescribe exactly 
what information should be reported.189 It is common, particularly for 
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developed countries, to provide some kind of report that compares tax 
expenditures to a defined, baseline, “normal” income or consumption 
tax. This is required, for example, in the Australian Charter.190 However, 
the reports are frequently not well integrated into the budget process, 
include inadequate estimates of lost revenue, and contain little or no evi-
dence about the distributive impact of particular tax concessions.191 This 
weakens their usefulness in improving transparency. 
Tax expenditure reporting could be strengthened significantly in de-
veloped and developing countries to illuminate the benefits received by 
different social groups and firms. India began releasing tax expenditure 
reports with its 2006–2007 budget, and in 2008–2009, it included a dis-
tributive analysis of corporate tax expenditures showing that the smallest 
firms were receiving the least benefits from these concessions.192 The 
Nigerian Fiscal Responsibility Law 2007, Section 11(3)(c)(iii), calls for 
an “aggregate tax expenditure projection” on a rolling three-year time 
horizon.193 Section 29(1) states that “[a]ny proposed tax expenditure shall 
be accompanied by an evaluation of its budgetary and financial implica-
tions in the year it becomes effective and in the three subsequent financial 
years,” and in the event of unplanned revenue losses, such expenditure 
requires offsetting measures “such as tax rate raises and expansion of the 
                                                                                                                       
the income tax law with a “benchmark” income tax said to be an ideal income tax system, 
has had a primarily political purpose, to draw legislators’ attention to the many conces-
sions, exemptions, and other incentives in the U.S. tax code and to the implicit “cost to 
revenue,” or revenue foregone, as a result of these concessions. For all of the flaws that 
can be identified with respect to the tax expenditure concept, this is still its most valuable 
function, and it is thus best understood as a strategic intervention into the budget process. 
 190. Charter of Budget Honesty Act, 1998, pt. 5, div. 1, cl. 12(1)(d) (Austl.). We do 
not propose here to enter the debate about how to define the baseline for identifying and 
measuring tax expenditures, but instead, see tax expenditure reporting as an additional 
and useful tool for analyzing and debating the distributional burdens and benefits of fiscal 
policy. 
 191. HANA POLACKOVA BRIXI, CHRISTIAN VALENDUC & ZHICHENG LI SWIFT, TAX 
EXPENDITURES: SHEDDING LIGHT ON GOVERNMENT SPENDING THROUGH THE TAX 
SYSTEM—LESSONS FROM DEVELOPED AND TRANSITION ECONOMIES (2003); Mark Burton, 
Making the Australian Tax Expenditures Statement an Effective Policy Instrument—From 
Fiscal Record to Transparent Report, 8 J. OF AUSTRALIAN TAX’N 1 (2005). 
 192. See GOV’T OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF FIN., UNION BUDGET RECEIPTS BUDGET 2008–
2009: REVENUE FOREGONE UNDER THE CENTRAL TAX SYSTEM: FINANCIAL YEARS 2006–
07 AND 2007–08, at Annex 12, 45 (2008), available at http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub200809/ 
rec/annex12.pdf; GOV’T OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF FIN., UNION BUDGET 2006–2007: TAX 
EXPENDITURE UNDER THE CENTRAL TAX SYSTEM: FINANCIAL YEAR 2004–2005, at Annex 
12, 45 (2006), available at http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2006-07/rec/annex12.pdf. 
 193. Fiscal Responsibility Act, Gazette of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, No. 126, 
Dec. 31, 2007, § 11(3)(c)(iii). See also Rising Hopes, supra note 127. 
842 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:3 
tax base.”194 This type of initiative could help build support for base-
broadening reforms in developing countries, which have been identified 
as crucial for increasing the resources available for antipoverty and other 
types of development spending. 
The strategy of using fiscal transparency and tax expenditure reporting 
to build domestic political support for base-broadening tax reforms could 
have some advantages over other strategies that focus on reducing tax 
competition through a more international coordination of tax policy. 
Many international tax scholars have criticized developing countries’ use 
of investment tax incentives, pointing out their negative effects on corpo-
rate tax revenue and on the efficiency and fairness of tax systems.195 The 
persistence of this form of tax competition has led some scholars to rec-
ommend changes in the way developed countries tax business income 
earned abroad by their resident multinationals. They have advocated eli-
minating any benefits from the host countries’ tax incentives, thereby 
freeing these countries from pressure to engage in self-destructive tax 
competition.196 Others have argued just the opposite, that developed 
countries should engage in more tax sparing to preserve the value of 
these incentives, on the basis that this may help developing countries 
attract much-needed investment and accord them greater autonomy over 
domestic tax policy.197 Promoting more transparency at the country level 
with respect to the cost and distributive impact of tax expenditures could 
help to resolve this impasse by enabling a country’s own citizens to chal-
lenge incentives that shift the burden of taxation onto local firms and 
individuals without achieving any clear benefits. Similarly, especially in 
developed countries, tax expenditures are a significant way for govern-
ments to deliver government spending programs.198 Requiring govern-
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ments to publicize with the budget an analysis of these effects would rad-
ically increase the overall transparency of fiscal policy. 
The gender budgeting initiatives undertaken in several countries, in-
cluding India and South Africa, provide yet another angle on distributive 
transparency.199 The Platform of Action adopted at the 1995 U.N. Fourth 
World Conference on Women, in Beijing, called on governments to “fa-
cilitate, at appropriate levels, more open and transparent budget 
processes”200 and mandated “the integration of a gender perspective in 
budgetary decisions on policies and programs.”201 In response, the Unit-
ed Nations and other international agencies organized to support many 
local gender budgeting projects at both the civil society and governmen-
tal level.202 The basic starting point for these projects is the fact that even 
though fiscal policy often purports to be gender neutral on its face, its 
impact is seldom gender neutral because of the different economic status 
and roles of men and women. A variety of methods are used to reveal 
and analyze the differential impacts of taxes and spending on women and 
men, in terms of both the distribution of costs and benefits, and beha-
vioral effects (for example, marginal choices between paid and unpaid 
labor, or the effectiveness of business incentives). In addition, many in-
itiatives focus on increasing women’s participation in budget processes 
as well as the capacity of civil society organizations to critically analyze 
budget documents from a gender perspective. Advocates of gender bud-
geting often use the language of transparency in describing its value. In 
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particular, the U.N. Financing for Development Conference has recently 
emphasized the importance of including a gender lens in the analysis of 
fiscal policy.203 This is in stark contrast with the standards of transparen-
cy articulated by the IMF and OECD, which do not mention gender im-
pact as a relevant fact to be reported by governments. With the exception 
of the IBP/IDASA report, gender also does not receive any explicit men-
tion in the NGO-led budget transparency exercises. 
V. FISCAL TRANSPARENCY AND DEMOCRATIC EMPOWERMENT 
Our genealogy of fiscal transparency indicates that the interventions of 
the IMF and OECD are directed mostly at promoting fiscal discipline 
and capital market efficiency. The institutional codes and best practices 
pay little attention to the democratic accountability aspects of transpa-
rency in budgeting, an area of government policy making that, as we 
have demonstrated elsewhere, is already prone to ignore citizens in favor 
of economic expertise and markets.204 While the IMF and OECD pay 
some lip service to citizen accountability, a detailed examination of the 
IMF Code and OECD Best Practices reveals a democratic deficit in rela-
tion to both the expected audience for fiscal transparency information 
and the overall understanding of the purpose and processes of budgeting. 
If the budget is, as the OECD suggests, the most important policy docu-
ment of a government, the question of who receives information and is 
empowered to participate is crucial for the legitimacy, fairness, and sus-
tainability of budget decisions. 
The IMF Code itself does not state who the expected audience is for 
fiscal information. The accompanying Manual notes that transparency 
involves openness to “the public” about “the structure and functions of 
government, fiscal policy intentions, public sector accounts, and fiscal 
projections.”205 The “public,” as explained by the Manual, incorporates 
four distinct audiences. First are governments themselves (past, current, 
and future), which should utilize budget analysis to improve economic 
decision making.206 Second are “citizens” and the goal of fiscal transpa-
rency here is to “giv[e] them the information they need to hold their gov-
ernment accountable for its policy choices.”207 The third audience is “in-
ternational capital markets,” and the last is the IMF itself, in its role in 
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the economic “surveillance” of member countries “to assess economic 
vulnerabilities.”208 The explicit recognition of citizens in the IMF Code is 
a significant change from the first edition, released in 1998, which em-
phasized “surveillance of economic policies by country authorities, fi-
nancial markets, and international institutions.”209 Indeed, according to a 
note in the 2001 edition of the Manual, “there is an issue as to the lan-
guage(s) in which information should be made available,” and this note 
even suggested that “it is unclear whether countries should routinely pub-
lish fiscal information, and economic information more generally, in a 
commonly-used language.”210 This note recognized, though, that “for 
countries seeking access to international capital markets, there is likely to 
be some benefit from translating key documents and reports for release 
simultaneously with national language versions.”211 
The OECD Best Practices also addresses the role of citizens, in par-
ticular, by requiring publication of reports and active promotion of citi-
zens’ and NGOs’ understanding of the budget process.212 Both the IMF 
Code and OECD Best Practices find that the most important way to 
achieve accountability to citizens is, unsurprisingly, through legislative 
review of an executive budget.213 As explained in Part III, Section A, for 
such accountability to have any content, this approach implicitly requires 
a democratic legislature. 
While the IBP and other organizations involved in budget assessment 
consider accountability to the legislature important, they have a different 
vision of democratic control over fiscal processes. The IBP Open Budget 
Initiative is explicitly oriented towards empowering relatively disadvan-
taged constituencies to engage with budgetary policy, though it is also 
concerned with exposing fiscal corruption or unrealistic and imprudent 
budgeting. NGO researchers in Latin America frame the issue as follows: 
“[p]articipation by the citizenry throughout the budget process is indis-
pensable, not only to strengthen the democracy of a country, but also 
because it represents an effective way to ensure that the population’s 
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most pressing needs are covered within the government’s budget.”214 In 
the index these researchers prepared, citizen participation received the 
lowest score of all its variables.215 
Although fiscal transparency laws and codes acknowledge the role of 
the legislature in constraining the executive from undisciplined spending 
and taxation, other rules seek to constrain the legislature by institutiona-
lizing stronger executive control over many budget decisions.216 The 
common factor in these apparently contradictory checks and balances is 
not accountability as such, but fiscal discipline to establish credibility for 
the market.217 
If the discussion is refocused towards the fundamental purpose of a 
budget, namely, to establish politically legitimate and sustainable distri-
butional decisions for a country, the meaning and uses of fiscal transpa-
rency may be reexamined. Fiscal transparency norms have the potential 
to expand the political space for budget decision making, allowing citi-
zens to participate in more than just elections for legislative representa-
tives in a given electoral cycle. Effective fiscal transparency norms could 
operate to connect fiscal policy makers with existing networks of go-
vernmental departments, businesses, civil society, and local communities 
in order to more effectively design, assess, and implement fiscal deci-
sions. Transparency norms and frameworks should seek to increase the 
knowledge of ordinary citizens and “civil society” about fiscal policy 
decisions and their impact on the distribution of benefits and burdens 
throughout society. 
The use of fiscal transparency norms to increase participation in bud-
geting fits with a global trend to encourage public participation in policy 
making. As a broad principle, the United Nations has stated that “wide-
spread participation in decision-making processes” is important in enabl-
ing “the creation of the critical mass of support needed to change institu-
tions.”218 The second half of the 1990s saw a massive enhancement of 
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consultation on expenditure policies in PRSPs associated with condition-
al loans from the IMF, the World Bank, and aid donors. This has been 
called a “paradigm shift” for development policy.219 A concept of “parti-
cipatory development” has become the norm, at least as a matter of rhe-
toric, in the broader development discourse, whether carried out by mul-
tilateral development agencies or NGOs.220 Using Bolivia, Burkina Faso, 
Cambodia, Tanzania, and Vietnam as case studies, a recent evaluation of 
PRSPs and their interaction with budget formation concluded that PRSPs 
have enhanced public education about government policies and expendi-
tures and, to some extent, have increased citizen participation in budget 
processes.221 
Despite this new emphasis on participation, some critics have sug-
gested that citizen participation in economic and fiscal policymaking is 
not well-embedded in existing political structures, such as parliaments.222 
A recent study criticizes the PRSP process as being insufficiently linked 
to budget and government fiscal agencies.223 It observes that the Ministry 
of Finance is not always given a lead role in the PRSP process, which is 
often established in a separate ministry.224 This is likely to lead to a fail-
ure of the Ministry of Finance to “own” the PRSP process. Such a “weak 
link between the PRSP and the budgets” is identified as a crucial prob-
lem in many countries; the solution seems to be to establish an MTEF, 
but doing so successfully, as outlined above, is very challenging.225 Prob-
lems also arise in ensuring that local governments participate in both 
PRSP formulation and budget decisions at a national level, although 
PRSPs are supposed to be driven by local-community consultation, and 
tax systems are increasingly decentralized. Furthermore, it is rare for 
consultation in a PRSP process to involve a discussion of taxation policy 
                                                                                                                       
 219. See Fantu Cheru, Building and Supporting PRSPs in Africa: What Has Worked 
Well So Far? What Needs Changing?, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 355, 364 (2006). Regarding 
Australia, see Mark Burton, Is Participatory Tax Transparency in Australia Achievable?, 
43 TAX NOTES INT’L 333 (2006) [hereinafter Burton, Participatory Tax Transparency]. 
 220. See, e.g., DEEPA NARAYAN & LYRA SRINIVASAN, WORLD BANK, PARTICIPATORY 
DEVELOPMENT TOOL KIT: MATERIALS TO FACILITATE COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT (1994); 
Maia Green, Participatory Development and the Appropriation of Agency in Southern 
Tanzania, 20 CRITIQUE OF ANTHROPOLOGY 67–89 (2000). 
 221. Rosa Alonso et al., PRSPs and Budgets: A Synthesis of Five Case Studies, in 
BUDGET SUPPORT AS MORE EFFECTIVE AID? RECENT EXPERIENCES AND EMERGING 
LESSONS, supra note 92, at 155, 159. 
 222. See Condon & Philipps, supra note 180, at 128; Kevin M. Morrison & Mathew 
M. Singer, Inequality and Deliberative Development: Revisiting Bolivia’s Experience 
with the PRSP, 25 DEV. POL’Y REV. 721 (2007). 
 223. Stevens, supra note 9, at 8–9. 
 224. Id. 
 225. See Cheru, supra note 219, at 362. 
848 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:3 
(as opposed to spending). Attention needs to be paid to identifying “me-
chanisms of accountability” that could incorporate the poor into the tax 
reform debate and “enhance their ability to articulate their interests and 
advance a progressive system of public finance, both in taxation and ex-
penditures.”226 The disconnect between participation in the PRSP process 
and the budget process is an indication of the inadequacy of fiscal trans-
parency norms, which have tended to focus heavily on prudence and dis-
cipline, rather than the legitimacy of budgetary policy. 
Consultation mechanisms have also become popular in many countries 
as a means of securing political support for tax reform.227 The IMF Code 
calls for adequate consultation in reform,228 but surprisingly, the OECD 
Best Practices does not. In developed countries, consultation about tech-
nical or detailed policy elements of tax reform is frequently carried out 
with the private sector. The advantages of such consultation may include 
provision of an external expert eye to identify issues, uncertainties, or 
problems with the law, and to provide examples and information about 
taxpayer practices, accounting, and other compliance issues. The expert 
may also ensure professional or business support for tax legislation and 
its effective implementation, which is likely to be politically important. 
As Gordon and Thuronyi have noted, less attention has been paid to the 
process of designing and drafting tax legislation in developing coun-
tries.229 
Consultation on aspects of policy, or the way a tax law or policy is im-
plemented or administered, is usually carried out with business groups 
and professional tax advisors, rather than with a broad spectrum of tax-
payers. However, consultation targeted to particular business sectors or 
taxpayers may collapse into a “thin” politics of taxation, which, as de-
scribed by Moore and Rakner, is essentially special interest groups nego-
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tiating behind closed doors.230 The “tax policy network” identified by 
Stewart with respect to taxation of the corporate sector in Australia is not 
open to broader citizen engagement, although it appears to have contri-
buted to some successful business tax reforms.231 Ideally, a fiscal trans-
parency law would build institutional procedures and mechanisms that 
would help ensure that consultation in policy formation is public to the 
greatest extent possible and that would enable a wide spectrum of tax-
payers an opportunity to engage in the process. 
A lack of consultation on tax reform often seems to go hand in hand 
with a failure to respect taxpayer rights and procedural or appellate 
processes concerning taxation, particularly in developing countries.232 In 
this context, the IMF Code’s incorporation of a requirement to ensure 
taxpayer rights and due process is likely to increase taxpayers’ capacity 
to engage in tax reform processes, though this capacity is somewhat indi-
rect. Business and taxpayer associations may not exist or may be poorly 
educated or resourced. There is also a need for “skilling up” both parlia-
mentarians and the wider population in all countries, so as to enable them 
to participate in consultation about tax reforms that will affect them and 
the broader public interest.233 Gordon and Thuronyi have also identified 
inadequate coordination between the legislative branch and tax policy 
makers in the treasury or executive branch. They argue that it is impor-
tant to both educate and consult with members of parliament, perhaps via 
a parliamentary committee, and with parliamentary staff.234 Formal inter-
est groups and business associations may be weak or subject to co-
option, thus creating an inadequate demand for broad consultation and 
hiding the influence of smaller groups.235 
The claim in support of consultation in budget policy is that it en-
hances information sharing, accountability, institutional knowledge, and 
public understanding, which in turn strengthen the quality and legitimacy 
of the budget.236 Often, however, there is an assumed dichotomy between 
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content and process in fiscal policy reform. That is, it is assumed that 
consultation will not affect the content of reforms (which can be deter-
mined by reference to abstract or “ideal” technical policy choices), but 
will simply enable the refining of a policy and assure more effective im-
plementation of that policy. This assumption is consistent with what has 
been termed the “technical idea” approach to a development intervention, 
an approach used across the broad field of development and according to 
which “effective political engagement is evidenced by receptivity to the 
technical idea and support of its implementation.”237 However, the se-
rious implementation of process-oriented reforms is likely to lead to sig-
nificant compromises in the ultimate content of tax and spending propos-
als. The discourse of transparency reflects an underlying tension between 
the drive for “best practice” policy and fiscal discipline, on the one hand, 
and the need to achieve a legitimate fiscal bargain among citizens, on the 
other.238 
There is a striking contrast between the OECD’s approach to fiscal 
transparency, which only marginally considers participation, and the 
considerable attention the OECD has paid in recent years to public par-
ticipation in Member States’ policy making more generally.239 In a re-
cent, substantial document on participatory policy making, the OECD 
identifies three different types of relationships, based on information, 
consultation, and active participation, respectively: “a one-way relation-
ship in which government produces and delivers information for use by 
citizens”; “a two-way relationship in which citizens provide feedback to 
government” on a defined issue; and “a relation based on partnership 
with government, in which citizens actively engage in defining the 
process and content of policy-making.”240 It seems safe to say that most 
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efforts at engaging citizens in tax reform initiatives or budget processes 
do not rise to the third level of active participation, and many involve 
only the provision of information to those who already have the skills to 
understand and utilize it. 
An alternative view of a successful development intervention by inter-
national experts or institutions is targeted towards local “ownership” and 
warns against the wholesale implementation of external technical ideas 
or blueprints without adequate local consideration. This view suggested 
by Andrews, involves the creation of “space in which the developing 
entity can identify, define, and solve its own problems.”241 The dominant 
fiscal transparency norms are not aimed at creating “space” for political 
negotiation or engagement concerning the budget. 
The IBP and other fiscal policy NGOs form part of an emergent civil 
society network within States and in the international arena that aims to 
fill this democratic deficit, but currently operates with limited communi-
cation and coherence among the different participants. The importance of 
civil society or independent critique of budget policy has been noted in a 
variety of contexts, including tax expenditures and gender budgeting. 
Without external monitoring and pressure, governments are unlikely to 
engage in meaningful disclosure or self-criticism of their policies. How-
ever, also well-known are the challenges of developing a civil society 
network that is both socially diverse and well-informed about fiscal poli-
cy. The international codes fail not only to prioritize information or 
processes that would serve economically marginalized groups in the 
wider civil society, but also to foster critical analysis by those interested 
in problems of poverty and inequality. 
Our call for “political space” and for increased citizen participation in 
fiscal policy (and other policy aimed at development) is grounded in a 
notion of “deliberative democracy.”242 Philip Pettit has argued that deli-
berative democracy should combine two dimensions: first, representative 
“contestatory institutions,” and second, institutions that remove some 
decisions from the immediately political domain, but are designed to 
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empower participation.243 Relevant to our discussion of budget transpa-
rency, “contestatory institutions” ensure that “the people” are “indivi-
dually enabled to act as editors of the laws and policies that the repre-
sentatives author—and author in their collective name.”244 On the other 
hand, the “depoliticizing” institutions “reduce” the “contestatory bur-
den,” including constitutional constraints and consultative procedures.245 
At their best, fiscal transparency laws and other laws relating to bud-
geting would empower “contestation”—participation in fiscal decision 
making—by informing and enabling citizens, while at the same time 
providing adequate constraints and procedures to achieve “realistic” out-
comes.246 These constraints could include the use of an MTEF, and re-
quirements to assess the achievement of development goals and to weigh 
distributive impact on both current and future generations. The Nigerian 
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2007 includes a number of provisions that 
gesture in this direction, though their impact on the ground is yet to be 
determined. For example, the Act creates a Fiscal Responsibility Com-
mission charged with implementing the statute and empowered to de-
mand relevant information from any person.247 The Commission has ten 
members, with one appointed to represent organized labor, and another 
to represent “[c]ivil [s]ociety engaged in causes relating to probity, 
transparency[,] and good governance.”248 The law also provides for time-
ly and wide publication of its many reports, including via the Internet.249 
Most interestingly, it gives standing to ordinary citizens to seek preroga-
tive orders or other remedies in the Federal High Court to enforce the 
law.250 
We call on the international financial institutions (“IFIs”) to turn their 
attention to fostering “contestatory” processes and networks both locally 
and internationally. What best practices could be identified at the country 
level for involving and providing resources to civil society? Could trans-
parency be broadened by promoting more effective parliamentary over-
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sight of fiscal policy impacts, including the wider use of committees and 
local community consultations? 
VI. FORMALISATION, META-INSTITUTIONS, AND GLOBAL NORMS 
This Article has sought to analyze and critique budget transparency 
laws through the lens of social justice and democratic values. In this final 
Part, we discuss the role of law in the network of codes, standards, and 
regulators dealing with fiscal transparency and operating at both an in-
ternational and national level. We also explore the import of fiscal trans-
parency for the broader project of “ruling the world.” Our analysis sug-
gests that the international institutions, and even NGOs, put considerable 
faith in law as a vehicle for mandating transparency and accountability. 
However, scholars of law and development have expressed skepticism 
about the role of law in development and the ability of law reform to en-
hance or influence development.251 
The IMF Code and OECD Best Practices are prime examples of the in-
creasing role of “soft law” in transnational economic governance. Soft 
law can be defined as standards or norms developed by quasi-public in-
ternational institutions, with a view to influencing policy development 
and practice at the state level so as to convince markets of sound eco-
nomic policy-making.252 They are just one element of a broader network 
of standards and codes at the international level aimed at establishing 
“good governance” norms so as to achieve “macroeconomic stability and 
high-quality growth.”253 Even the “hardest” set of global rules, the Maas-
tricht fiscal rules for the euro area, operates in practice predominantly as 
a set of procedural and reporting requirements.254 
The IMF Code and OECD Best Practices also seek to embed and legi-
timate other global norms or standards with respect to government fiscal, 
monetary, and investment policies. The IMF Manual notes that the Code 
is “one of [twelve] standards that have been recognized by the interna-
tional community” (and endorsed by the IMF and the World Bank) in 
various guises.255 The Code is also supported by private sector investors 
as one of twelve key international standards deserving of priority imple-
mentation by governments.256 The OECD Best Practices forms an ele-
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ment of its overall Policy Framework for Investment. In addition to pro-
posing ten policy “domains” that have the most impact on investment, 
and setting out questions or issues for governments to consider in each 
domain, the Framework seeks “to define the respective responsibilities of 
government, business and other stakeholders and to pinpoint where in-
ternational co-operation can most effectively redress weaknesses in the 
investment environment.”257 Transparency in policy development and 
implementation is one of three core principles that underlie the Frame-
work, together with “policy coherence” and regular evaluation of poli-
cies’ impact.258 
The expansion of efforts in monitoring aid and government expendi-
tures is a part of the World Bank’s efforts to monitor and implement 
“governance” reforms worldwide. These efforts are epitomized by the 
World Bank’s Governance Indicators, which seeks to measure gover-
nance quality across six dimensions and 212 countries and territories.259 
Most of these dimensions could incorporate fiscal transparency, but it 
has not always been the subject of attention.260 The Indicators draw on a 
range of institutional, governmental, nongovernmental, and academic 
sources for components of data, and these have recently begun to include 
monitoring of fiscal transparency.261 
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Together with a host of international regulators or observers led by the 
IFIs, these standards and codes create an international web of metaregu-
lation (of States by States and nonstate actors) that has the primary goal 
of ensuring that governments are more fully subjected to the discipline of 
well-informed markets. As illustrated in this Article, this range of inter-
national standards can infiltrate local policy making in a variety of ways, 
including country surveillance by the IMF, creation of an OECD data-
base then used by academic researchers to rank country performance, 
and incentives for developing countries to participate as a way of demon-
strating good governance. 
In particular countries, substantive fiscal transparency norms may be 
embedded in a legislative framework—that is, may assume a formal le-
gal character—but they are more often built into “soft” procedural rules 
or codes that governments will adhere to because of political, rather than 
legal, constraints. Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom have 
each chosen not to legislate hard fiscal targets or rules. Instead, they ap-
ply transparency requirements to impose fiscal discipline. Many of these 
requirements, such as medium-term frameworks, are not legislated, al-
though all three countries legislate reporting, auditing, and institutional 
independence requirements.262 By contrast, many developing countries 
have attempted to combine hard legal restrictions for deficits with a 
range of legal and nonlegal transparency obligations. Mike Stevens re-
minds us that it is important to look at the history of budgeting laws and 
processes in a country when analyzing and seeking to “modernize” the 
budgeting frameworks of many developing countries along the lines pro-
posed by the IMF and OECD.263 Some countries, like India and South 
Africa, provide a much more diverse set of reports and information than 
is required in their legal systems, largely in response to legislators’ con-
cerns and an active, vocal civil society and NGO sector. The effective-
ness and content of fiscal transparency norms are both largely shaped by 
domestic politics and pre-existing institutions, not by formal laws. 
In practice, country transparency laws and norms, even if strictly non-
binding, may have the effect of binding future governments in all but the 
most extreme circumstances: “in practice it is also the case that given 
that the [United Kingdom] now has a code in place it might be very diffi-
cult for a future government to remove or substantially loosen the code 
without significant loss to its economic credibility.”264 A future govern-
ment may only succeed in removing a fiscal code in a time of crisis. The 
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global financial crisis of 2008, in which governments have been required 
to spend unprecedented levels of public funds to support banks, mort-
gage institutions, and credit markets, as well to stimulate countries out of 
recession, may have given governments some flexibility to operate with 
significant fiscal deficits for a period of time. Whether governments gen-
erate adequate authority to raise taxes if required is yet to be seen. 
Are global transparency norms, which seem to be the goal of the IMF 
and the OECD, desirable or useful, or are policies designed in one con-
text simply being transplanted elsewhere without adequate attention to 
local visions of development? Would local development or experimenta-
tion—or grassroots action—be better? Rodrik argues that institutions are 
central to development, but the most successful institutions tend to be 
local and embedded.265 We argue here that international transparency 
norms have positive potential but that more attention must be paid to lo-
cal (or national) distributional and democratic implications of fiscal 
transparency. We have observed that the dominant institutional ap-
proaches to fiscal transparency tend to call for comprehensive and timely 
disclosure of certain kinds of “relevant” fiscal information, so that exter-
nal parties, including lenders, institutions and markets, can assess the 
“performance” or “effectiveness” of government. Budget transparency 
norms with only this goal may ensure accountability of a government to 
lenders and donors, but a different sort of information and analysis is 
called for to ensure the “effectiveness” of government performance and 
accountability to local constituencies in a particular country. Regarding 
the “law and development” debate more generally, Kennedy has sug-
gested that formalization itself may be of greater benefit to outsiders than 
to locals.266 Discretionary or unformalized taxing and spending powers 
may operate predictably for local people, but not for external investors. 
There is, of course, a danger of relativism: discretionary powers are very 
likely to be applied for the benefit of only some local participants, in a 
way that discriminates against the less powerful and less well resourced 
in a national economy, such as a rural underclass, urban factory workers 
at the mercy of footloose industries, or women. Nonetheless, as noted by 
Kennedy, it is important to acknowledge squarely the politics embedded 
in apparently neutral standards and procedural norms.267 
A related question is whether the transfer of such global transparency 
norms across borders challenges national control over economic policy. 
Fiscal policies are classically the domain of national governments, a core 
                                                                                                                       
 265. See RODRIK, supra note 112. 
 266. Kennedy, supra note 7, at 22. 
 267. Id. 
2009] FISCAL TRANSPARENCY 857 
element of the sovereign State. In particular (but not only) for developing 
countries, however, tax and spending policies are increasingly formu-
lated at a global level, utilizing expertise in international and regional 
institutions. In the era of globalization, the “fiscal compact” must be un-
derstood as traversing national boundaries. It concerns both the relation-
ship between a national government (or other levels of government) and 
citizens in that country, and the relationship of the government and these 
citizens with other countries and organizations in the international 
sphere. In this broad sense, the “fiscal compact” encompasses all ele-
ments of a government budget, including taxes, spending, aid, debt, and 
the political and institutional arrangements necessary to sustain equitable 
development through the budget. 
Recently, various commentators have begun to envisage what global 
governance might look like.268 Tax scholars have envisaged various 
means of collecting and distributing tax revenues at the global level, ei-
ther through the establishment of an international tax organization that 
would enable significantly enhanced cooperation and sharing among 
countries, or even through an international tax.269 As discussed with re-
spect to tax expenditures, above, international coordination is argued by 
many to be essential to stop harmful tax competition with respect to cor-
porate tax incentives. International tax policy literature has debated the 
problem of how to increase multilateral coordination in a manner consis-
tent with international equity.270 As outlined above, there has also been a 
significant increase in cooperation regarding the delivery of aid and the 
implementation of lending—on one level, this is the “transfer” element 
of a nascent global tax system. 
Increased fiscal transparency at a country level is likely to enhance a 
country’s domestic political and social fiscal compact, which is nego-
tiated at national, provincial, and local levels of government. At present, 
fiscal transparency rules and norms tend to enhance accountability of 
national governments, especially those of developing countries, to exter-
nal lenders and donors rather than to the domestic polity. We argue that 
national budgets remain the centerpiece for establishing a sustainable 
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fiscal compact for development. New developments in international aid 
that link it to the budget process seek, however imperfectly, to integrate 
the global and national dimensions of the fiscal compact by engaging 
international agencies, donors, and recipients in budget policy making. 
This is promising because the budget process provides a space for con-
testing the distributive and other consequences of taxing and spending. 
One difficult question, though, is how a country’s budget process can 
handle so many different policy goals and stakeholders in an effective 
manner. 
In conclusion, we find that global norms of fiscal transparency have 
been developed through a complex interaction of international and do-
mestic processes, public and private actors, and soft and hard legal 
forms. While there is an obvious pattern of norm transfer from interna-
tional agencies to the domestic level, the reverse has also occurred. Cer-
tain developed countries have been especially influential in defining 
what constitutes best practice, and this points to a concern about the im-
plications of simply transplanting these norms around the world without 
adequate attention to local priorities and stages of development. Fur-
thermore, the distinction between soft and hard law is often blurry. In-
formal norms may have de facto enforcement mechanisms having to do 
with market credibility and access to loans, thus giving them some cha-
racteristics of hard law for developing countries. Conversely, domestic 
fiscal transparency legislation may take the form of hard law, but its 
power may be primarily symbolic and contingent on the strength of do-
mestic institutions, making it similar to soft law. 
Global fiscal transparency norms may be an important pillar in a global 
fiscal framework that links citizens, local and national governments, and 
international institutions. This pillar could comprise a first step in meta-
regulation of a global fiscal federation.271 It may also be combined with a 
move in many sectors, but pushed primarily by NGOs, towards establish-
ing increased transparency and accountability in the international finan-
cial institutions and other agencies with respect to their policy prescrip-
tions and funding choices.272 The IMF and other organizations are  
increasingly engaging directly with civil society as well as with govern-
ments.273 On one level, this engagement is aimed at improving the 
processes and outcomes of these agencies’ activities; for example, a fair-
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ly widespread consultation took place with respect to the revision of the 
2007 IMF Code. On another level, this engagement is aimed at increas-
ing the legitimacy of the IFIs themselves in the face of public opposition 
to organizational policies. As Ben Thirkill-White explains, however, this 
involves agencies such as the IMF in an inevitably political process and 
therefore sits uneasily with their current technocratic function of manag-
ing global stability.274 
This Article calls for carefully balancing these goals with the promo-
tion of a meaningful and inclusive fiscal politics at the domestic level. 
Budgeting remains primarily an activity of nation states. A particular 
fiscal bargain between growth- and equity-promoting policies needs do-
mestic support in order to gain traction. Our study draws attention to the 
equal importance of domestic budget processes and institutions in gene-
rating the political support needed for fiscal reforms, including any new 
forms of transnational cooperation. 
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